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  • Daguo quanli zhuanyi yu jishu bianqian (Power Transition among Great Powers and the Transformation of Technology) by Huang Qixuan
  • Jing Ye
Daguo quanli zhuanyi yu jishu bianqian (Power Transition among Great Powers and the Transformation of Technology), by Huang Qixuan. Shanghai: Shanghai jiaotong daxue chubanshe, 2013. 269pp. RMB 35 (Paperback). ISBN 9787313095572.

Under what conditions can breakthroughs in science and technology be achieved? Why did many major scientific and technological innovations occurr simultaneously in certain periods of human history? Huang Qixuan provides a convincing answer to these questions in his book Power Transition among Great Powers and Technology Change. He notices that many breakthroughs in science and technology occur during peacetime, although war often leads to scientific and technological innovations. He argues that power transition among great powers is a key driving force behind scientific and technological changes. Great powers here refers to countries that possess not only vast natural resources, such as land and population, but also strong economic and military power. Power transition means the power competition between the hegemonic power and the challenging powers. In order to win this competition, both the hegemonic power and the challenging powers have strong incentives to push forward their technological and scientific innovation. On the one hand, they will be the most important investors to launch and support scientific and technological innovation, especially in the military field. On the other hand, they will also act as the purchasers of high-end technology for national defense. These dual state roles as investors and buyers greatly promote the rapid development of science and technology.

Huang proves this proposition through the cases of the Soviet Union, the United States, and China in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. Among these three great powers, the United States is the hegemonic power, while the other two have been challenging powers at different times. According to the author, when the Soviet Union was in the position of challenger, it made great efforts to advance its science and technology. When the Soviet Union’s power declined very sharply and it became unable to perform the role of the challenger, its investment in scientific and technological advancement declined accordingly. In the case of the United States, there were three waves of government investment in scientific research since 1953. The case of contemporary China offers further evidence to support this proposition: the Chinese government has devoted great sums of investment to seek autonomy in science and technology. Discussed in the following chapter are the cases of Japan, Europe, and imperial China. [End Page 249] The author provides a new explanation of the famous “Needham Puzzle,” which refers to the standstill of science and technology in imperial China. Huang argues that the absence of external threats hindered the development of science and technology in imperial China.

Several issues are not successfully addressed in this book. The first is Huang’s analysis of the relationship between power transition and scientific and technological advancement. He argues that power transition drives scientific and technological development; however, one can also posit the advancement of science and technology is the cause of power transition.

The second problem concerns the author’s distinction between great powers and minor powers. The book concentrates on the power transition of the countries he defines as great powers. However, the world’s countries cannot be neatly divided into the two categories of great powers and minor powers; many countries fall between these two categories, and the role they play in world politics remains to be further investigated. Therefore, besides the competition between a hegemonic power and the challenging power, there are myriad other forms of competition in the international arena, such as competition among challenging powers, or between the middle and minor powers as well. Given this, it is important to further inquire how these forms of competition affect scientific and technological innovations.

Finally, the book does not address the impact of domestic institutional arrangements. As Huang himself acknowledges in the book’s conclusion, state investment and purchasing alone do not necessarily lead to scientific and technological innovation. Domestic institutional arrangements, which play a significant role in the advancement of science and technology, are likely to account for this observed...

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