Goliad: The Other Alamo by William R. Bradle, and Slaughter at Goliad: The Mexican Massacre of 400 Volunteers by Jay A. Stout (review)

ary literature on the Cherokees, and he includes a useful bibliographic essay. The author generally maintains his objectivity throughout, focusing on the factual information (who, what, when, and where). Overall, Conley does a fine job of striking both a chronological and geographical balance in A Cherokee Encyclopedia, devoting ample space to twentieth-century Cherokee people, who are often overlooked in favor of their ancestors, particularly those who suffered through the removal era. Moreover, the Eastern Band of Cherokees of western North Carolina receive more attention here than usual. The work, however, is not without minor problems. A few of the nonbiographical entries are too short and general to be helpful to many readers. Furthermore, topics such as Worldview, Cherokee Culture, and Weapons are likely not of much assistance for readers unfamiliar with the Cherokees, and some experts may find them, and a few other entries, to be so general as to be misleading . Nevertheless, Conley has compiled an impressive list of Cherokee people, places, and events. And the entries are concise, accessible, and well written. Consequently, Conley achieves his primary goal: A Cherokee Encyclopedia is, indeed, a handy reference for those interested in Cherokee history, culture, and people. East Carolina University Christopher Arris Oakley Goliad: The Other Alamo. By William R. Bradle. (Gretna, La.: Pelican Publishing Company, 2007. Pp. 252. Bibliography, index. ISBN 978-1-58980-457-9. $26.00, cloth.) Slaughter at Goliad: The Mexican Massacre of 400 Volunteers. By Jay A. Stout. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2008. Pp. 260. Illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography, index. ISBN 978-1-59114-843-2. $29.95, cloth.) The past two years have seen the publication of two books of very similar scope and ambition, each hoping to raise public awareness of the bloody events of the Texas Revolution that transpired in and around Goliad in March 1836. Authors William Bradle and Jay Stout agree that these events, though critically important in determining both the character and the outcome of that conflict, have for too long been overshadowed by the story of the Alamo and its legendary heroes. They each seek to redress that imbalance, but neither of these seriously flawed works is likely to reach that goal. Bradle’s Goliad: The Other Alamo is the least impressive of the two. Fraught with careless factual errors, especially in its early sections on the historical background of the Texas Revolution, the book is based on a slim and dated bibliography . The author provides no citations for his claims or quotations, but it is clear that he has made heavy use of online sources, especially the memoirs of Goliad survivors found on the Sons of Dewitt Colony Texas site maintained by Wallace L. McKeehan. These problems do not necessarily invalidate Bradle’s most interesting argument : that what happened at Goliad “had more impact on Texas independence than the fall of the Alamo” (p. 227). The basic story can be succinctly told. After 318 Southwestern Historical Quarterly January *jan 09 11/26/08 12:00 PM Page 318 the capture of San Antonio by the Texan rebels in December 1835, the revolution ’s center of gravity swung southeast, as several ambitious men sought to make Refugio and San Patricio the launching pads for an offensive expedition to the alluring city of Matamoros, across the Rio Grande. Texan general Sam Houston tried to head off this risky endeavor by appealing to the better judgment of the volunteer troops, and the self-proclaimed leaders of the Matamoros Expedition, Frank Johnson and James Grant, were able to persuade only a small portion of their gathered forces to follow them south to disastrous defeat. The bulk of the Texan volunteers fell back with Col. James Walker Fannin to the old Spanish presidio at Goliad, which they fortified in expectation of a Mexican assault. When the Alamo came under siege, reinforcements sent by Fannin were able to proceed less than a mile before they faltered because of a lack of both resources and planning. After the fall of the Alamo on March 6, Houston ordered Fannin to destroy the presidio and retreat, but through incompetence and indecision, the “Hamlet of the Texas Revolution” frittered away his forces, delayed until retreat...