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  • Taking disadvantage seriously:The ‘underclass’ in post-apartheid South Africa
  • Jeremy Seekings (bio)

Inequalities are stark and obvious in post-apartheid South Africa. How to analyse inequalities, however, is far less clear. In Class, Race and Inequality in South Africa (Seekings and Nattrass 2005), we combined original analysis of quantitative data with critical use of a wide range of secondary historical, anthropological and sociological studies to examine both continuities and changes in the South African social structure over the second half of the twentieth century.

Of the various arguments made in our book, the one that provokes the most criticism is our identification of an ‘underclass’ in post-apartheid South Africa. Focusing on this, Callebert (2014)1 argues that our analysis ‘assume[s] a fundamental divide in South Africa’s economy based on socio-economic exclusion’, ‘fail[s] to capture the many ways in which people cross these divides in making a living’ and has ‘problematic policy implications’. In his account, we offer a ‘bifurcated’ or ‘dualist’ analysis of the South African economy. ‘Access to formal sector jobs’ is the ‘new and fundamental divide that runs through South African society.…In this [that is, our] argument, being a labourer no longer puts one among the lower rungs of society, but is a privilege.…’ For Seekings and Nattrass, he writes, ‘the true socio-economic divide … is between those with and those without access to jobs and other income-earning opportunities’. We are guilty, it seems, of proposing not only that ‘the poor’ should become ‘low-paid labourers’, but that ‘non-unionized low-paid jobs’ should be created ‘at the expense of better-paid unionized employees’.2

Callebert’s article raises some important points, but it is based on a gross misrepresentation of our argument in Class, Race and Inequality. We do not present a ‘dualist’ or ‘bifurcated’ analysis of South African society. Our analysis of the class structure identified nine or ten classes, on the basis of occupation and earnings from wealth or entrepreneurial activity, not two as implied in Callebert’s charge of dualism. We combined these into three (not two) composite categories or strata (see Seekings and Nattrass 2005: 254, Figure 7.1; 337, Figure 9.4). Our ‘underclass’ formed one part of the poorest or most disadvantaged of these three strata. Moreover, this disadvantaged stratum comprised also what we called the [End Page 135] ‘marginal working class’ (as well as a residual ‘other’ category) (see also Seekings and Nattrass, 2002: 2–3; Seekings, 2003a, 2003b, 2011). Our analysis thus recognized that many working people (and their dependants) experience disadvantages and poverty in a similar way to the households that we classified as part of the ‘underclass’.

Callebert employs the discursive device of labelling working people as ‘labourers’: ‘When one considers the conditions and pay of many of South Africa’s labourers, it does seem difficult to argue that they are privileged.’ Yes, it is hard to argue that ‘labourers’ in marginal or precarious employment – for example, on farms or construction sites – are privileged in any substantial sense relative to the households we included in the ‘underclass’. That is why we did not argue this. As Callebert himself acknowledges elsewhere in his article, our discussion of the ‘underclass’ entailed drawing a contrast primarily with the formally employed, mostly skilled workers who comprise the core membership of most trade unions, not the working poor. It is the unionized school teacher, car worker and even bus driver who are privileged relative to the working poor and underclass (although they are not nearly as privileged as the much richer, upper classes).

Having misrepresented our argument, Callebert proceeds to criticize it using a series of arguments. We allegedly underestimate redistribution from working people to the ‘underclass’, either within households or through remittances between households. We allegedly fail to notice that households employ complex livelihood strategies. We allegedly ignore the ‘structural connections’ between different kinds of households in terms of the political economy of capitalism. And, finally, we assert (allegedly not only without evidence, but also mistakenly) that our supposedly distinct classes have divergent or contradictory interests.

South Africa’s poor comprise both working poor and unemployed, and many poor households include both working...

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