Abstract

After presenting and criticizing recent theoretical work on the nature of delusional belief, I argue that the works of the later Wittgenstein and Donald Davidson offer heretofore underappreciated insights into delusional belief. I distinguish two general kinds of delusion: pedestrian and stark. The former can be explained as cognitive mistakes of various kinds, whereas the latter I argue are necessarily inexplicable. This thesis requires the denial of the Davidsonian dogma that rationality is constitutive of mental content. I claim that the dogma holds only for normal cognition and is violated precisely in the case of stark delusion.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1086-3303
Print ISSN
1071-6076
Pages
pp. 25-34
Launched on MUSE
2004-03-25
Open Access
No
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