Introduction: First Beings in American Indian Literatures

Narratives concerning the relationships between Indigenous humans and other species are ubiquitous in American Indian literatures. These narratives can be found in everything from oral literature to Indigenous science fiction.¹ Cherokee writer William Sanders provides an excellent example of the latter in his short story "At Ten Wolf Lake." Sanders's story is set in a world where mythical creatures, such as Sasquatch, abound. While I use the term Sasquatch to describe these beings, that is not quite accurate per the story. Sasquatch refers to a similar but separate group of beings in Sanders's speculative world. We learn that the term Hominid American is too politically correct and awkward. Instead, most beings of this type prefer "Homin or Hom" (Sanders 414). In one episode of the story, we meet a Hom named Charley who belongs to a militant Hom activist group. Sitting beside him in a truck is an Indian man who belongs to a politically analogous human group. A bumper sticker on Charley's truck reads "FIRST BEINGS POWER" with a hairy fist beside it (424). This provocative sticker signifies the possibility that agency (in this case, political agency) is not limited to the human species.² Although seemingly a novel notion, many Native ideologies do not define humans as categorically different from or superior to nonhuman animals. Categorical difference and exceptional humanity have, however, been integral to many of the dominant narratives that inform colonial ideologies. Historically these invading ideologies have ignored the political agency of other species, an unfortunate effect of which was a change in Indigenous hunting practices. This change, which is reflected in oral literatures, encouraged near decimation of certain species for economic gain.³ Although often overlooked, American Indian literatures are ideal for animal studies scholarship, which can in turn benefit Native studies by helping us investigate our relationships with other animals.

Here I am using the term other animals synonymously with what many animal studies scholars label nonhuman animals. Richard D. Ryder finds the term nonhuman problematic because it assumes the human as the normal example of a species (2). But the term nonhuman is helpful in signaling animal as a problematic signifier while simultaneously implying the need for more precise language (such as distinguishing by species). I will use the terms other, nonhuman, and first beings somewhat interchangeably when referring to those who are commonly labeled as animals. The term first beings, however, signals the possibility of shared indigeneity between human and nonhuman animals.

Before I start exploring the line of inquiry that I refer to as the study of first beings—how Indigenous peoples narrate our relationships with other animals—it would be helpful to situate it in the broader field of animal studies. Animal studies as a field of inquiry is about our complex relationships with nonhuman animals. In writing about our relationships with other animals, Peter Singer utilizes the term speciesism—which Ryder coined via pamphlets at Oxford in 1970—for his book Animal Liberation (1975). In the book Singer defines speciesism as "a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of one's own species and against those of members of other species" (6). He explains that what is needed to combat speciesist systems of thought is for us to give "equal consideration" to the interests of other animals (2). In his inclusion of beings outside humanity, Singer follows Jeremy Bentham's assertion that when thinking about the differences between humans and other species, "[t]he question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?" (283). Redirecting the comparison between humans and nonhumans to the question of suffering forces the discourse into accounting for the ethical logics, or lack thereof, of our complex relationships with other animals.⁴ It recognizes nonhuman animals as beings whose interests deserve "equal consideration" in any rational and systematically equitable theory of ethics. Following Bentham, Singer persuasively argues that avoiding suffering is clearly an interest of all sentient animals. A principle of equal consideration brings academic philosophical traditions more closely in line with Indigenous ways of thinking...