After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies by Christopher M. Davidson (review)

Known for his monographs on Dubai and Abu Dhabi,¹ Christopher Davidson predicts in his latest book the collapse of the Gulf monarchies.² He repeats a forecast that was made many times since oil was struck: “Most of these regimes — at least in their present form — will be gone within the next two to five years.” (p. ix) His argument, inspired by the rentier state model and modernization theory, is simple: After decades of political apathy fostered by high revenues and government largesse, “greater modernizing forces” have emerged in 2011. Social media in particular have allowed “Gulf nationals … to share information freely amongst themselves in an educated manner [sic]” (p. 231). Unlike previous opposition movements, these new forces will take advantage of the monarchies’ internal and external weaknesses. According to Davidson, dramatic change is bound to ensue; although he says only when (in “two to five years”), not how, people will bring down the regimes.

The British imperial legacy largely accounts for the regimes’ authoritarianism (Chapter 1). Gulf elites overcame this grim heritage by distributing oil revenues, co-opting religion, rewriting history, and investing in soft power strategies (Chapters 2 and 3). But their archaic and inefficient policies (in Davidson’s opinion) resulted in poverty, unemployment, sectarianism, corruption, and censorship (Chapter 4). The elites also face external pressures, costly military spending, and an inflated Iranian threat (Chapter 5). The sixth and last chapter summarizes the 2011/12 protests and their violent repression. The conclusion leaves the reader dissatisfied, as stories of recent crackdowns invalidate the book’s initial thesis. The regimes seem to hold up pretty well after all.

Davidson’s arguments would be more convincing if they were supported by primary sources in Arabic, not English-language press articles and news agency items. He could also have explored two elements that are crucial to the regimes’ resilience, but that he discards too quickly. The first is clientelism. After the 1973 oil boom, ruling families created vast fiefdoms to spread the wealth around and keep in check as many people as possible. That these networks do not include everybody does not mean that they no longer guarantee the elites’ survival: poverty and unemployment do not automatically translate into political activism. The exclusion of religious minorities does not necessarily signal failed states. Clientelism does not result from deeply ingrained religious sentiment either, but from crafty divide-and-rule policies.³ In 2011, the most violent confrontation took place in Shi‘a-majority Bahrain, where the Sunni ruling family’s sectarian politics endangered its very survival. Everywhere else in the Gulf, sectarianism tends to reinforce the powers that be, as most people close ranks around the elites against the specter of a fifth column.

The second missing element is state violence. In 1979, at least 4,000 people, mostly bystanders, were killed during the repression of the movement occupying the Mecca Grand Mosque.⁴ In the 1990s, Saudi political prisoners were skinned alive or dragged behind cars until death.⁵ In Saudi Arabia alone, there are now reportedly 30,000 political prisoners.⁶ But spectacular violence is not only exerted against political opponents. Since their creation, Gulf states have displaced populations; eradicated cultures; and infantilized and subdued women, youth, and foreigners. Recent studies of the region broach some of these topics;⁷ but the book, inexplicably, does not mention them. Researched and written in haste, After the Sheikhs ultimately fails to convince: once the book read, Davidson’s prediction sounds like a piece of hype, not of serious scholarship.