Abstract

Under the existing marriage contracts, the default length of a marriage is the total remaining lifespan of the spouses. This paper aims at questioning the standard long-term marriage contracts by exploring the conditions under which short-term contracts would be more desirable. Using a two-period collective household model, we show that, under general conditions on individual preferences and household production technology, short-term marriage contracts, if available, would dominate long-term contracts. Moreover, the recent equalization of bargaining power within the household is shown to make short-term contracts even more desirable than in the past.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1549-0955
Print ISSN
0032-471X
Launched on MUSE
2014-01-19
Open Access
No
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