Nietzsche and Kant on the Pure Impulse to Truth

When it comes to truth, most interpreters assume that Nietzsche is primarily interested in one of two questions. First, what is the nature of truth? Second, what is the value of truth? In this article, I want to focus on a third question. In his early essay, "On Truth and Falsity in Their Ultramoral Sense," Nietzsche raises a question about the origin of our pure impulse to truth. ¹ I will suggest that, for Nietzsche, the third question is the central question and must be answered before we can attempt to answer the other two.

I maintain that Nietzsche's answer to the question about the origin of our pure impulse to truth can be defended using arguments from Kant's ethics and aesthetics. ² According to Kant, both empiricist and rationalist accounts of morality are mistaken, and for roughly the same reason. They both attempt to ground morality in a principle of self-love. In a strikingly similar fashion, Nietzsche claims that both empiricists and rationalists attempt to ground their accounts of truth in vanity. The upshot of the arguments is that our commitment to the principles of morality must, according to Kant, be grounded upon a pure incentive of respect, and our commitment to inquiry must, according to Nietzsche, be grounded upon a pure love of the truth. For both Kant and Nietzsche, what is at issue is the purity of the motive.

The similarities between Kant's rejection of consequentialism in ethics and Nietzsche's rejection of consequentialism in the pursuit of truth might help us better understand Nietzsche's criticisms. At the same time, they do not explain why Nietzsche maintains that the origin of our pure impulse to the truth is to be found in art. In order to make better sense of Nietzsche's appeal to art, I begin with Kant's aesthetics. For both Kant and Nietzsche, it is aesthetics that teaches us to love from a pure impulse. I will lay emphasis on the idea that Kant's aesthetic argument against consequentialism is structurally similar to his ethical argument against consequentialism. When it comes to certain questions about truth, however, the aesthetic argument for a pure impulse is the stronger of the two.

I divide the article into four sections. First, I reconstruct Nietzsche's presuppositions about the origin of the human powers of cognition. Second, I compare Nietzsche's arguments against rival accounts of the truth to Kant's ethical argument against consequentialism. Third, I compare Nietzsche's arguments against rival accounts of the truth to Kant's aesthetic argument against consequentialism. Finally, I examine the strengths and weaknesses of an aesthetic defense of Nietzsche's claims and try to determine whether or not such an argument is successful against Kant's own account of moral truth.

1. A Reconstruction of Nietzsche's Presuppositions

In his early essay on truth, Nietzche offers an explicit answer to the question, What is truth? He starts by telling us what truth is not. On the one hand, there is no such thing as a pure truth. We have no access to things as they are in themselves. Truth is not a logical relation between concepts and objects. This amounts to a rejection of a rationalist account of truth. On the other hand, concepts are not true in virtue of their being grounded on perceptions that resemble their objects. Truth is not a causal relation between objects, nerve impulses, perceptions, and concepts. This amounts to a rejection of an empiricist conception of truth. Having told us what truth is not, Nietzsche turns to what truth is. Truth is a sum of effects. It is a mobile army of metaphors.

Most interpreters agree that Nietzsche challenges a traditional account of truth. If most interpreters are right, then how should we understand his recommendations for rethinking the nature of truth? On the one hand, interpreters such as A. C...