On the Possibility of Evidence for Intrinsic Value in Nature

One of the most common projects among environmental ethicists is to develop theories according to which some non-human natural entities possess intrinsic value. However, this project has not been unchallenged. From time to time we have seen efforts to refute it, the claim being that not only are the particular theories suggested flawed, but the very idea of intrinsic value in nature—at least in some allegedly important sense of “intrinsic value”—is in principle indefensible. One of the latest contributions to this line of efforts was recently provided by Toby Svoboda, whose target is mind-independent intrinsic value of non-human entities. Svoboda elegantly argues that there is no evidence for the existence of such value in non-humans, and that hence the position that some non-humans have such value is unjustified. In this paper I aim to show that Svoboda’s argument, elegant as it is, nevertheless is flawed.