Abstract

This paper examines the law and economics of international enforcement against maritime piracy. It explains why, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, countries choose to underinvest in enforcement to the extent that shipping companies have been forced to increase their use of on-board security guards. The paper examines the recommendations of several legal scholars for dealing with enforcement, and while these arguments have merit, important objections to them are discussed. Free riding on enforcement against criminals on the high seas is an illustration of the anarchy of the international system, the paper argues.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1945-4724
Print ISSN
1945-4716
Pages
pp. 117-126
Launched on MUSE
2013-11-25
Open Access
No
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