Nyāya Perceptual Theory: Disjunctivism or Anti-Individualism?

The thesis that error asymmetrically depends on truth is the thesis that veridicality and truth is conceptually prior to non-veridicality and error with respect to cognition and perception. Epistemic disjunctivism is the thesis that there is no common kind of experience between veridical and non-veridical states that is of robust explanatory value for the purposes of philosophical investigation into perception. In what follows the issue is explored whether Nyāya perceptual theory endorses epistemic disjunctivism or anti-individualism. It is explored against the background of examining Matthew Dasti’s (2012) argument for the view that Nyāya perceptual theory does anticipate contemporary epistemic disjunctivism on the basis of its endorsement of the parasitism of error on truth. In the present account, exploration of the issue is enhanced and better situated for further investigation by paying attention to the intricate debate between Tyler Burge and John McDowell on epistemic disjunctivism, perceptual antiindividualism, and the relevance of the vision sciences to the philosophy of perception. Following Dasti, the view is accepted that Nyāya perceptual theory endorses the idea that error is asymmetrically dependent on truth. However, the claim is drawn into question that they would genuinely accept McDowell’s form of epistemic disjunctivism. Instead, it is argued that Nyāya perceptual theory is amenable to Tyler Burge’s (2005) Perceptual Anti-individualism. The present investigation discusses the Nyāya Misplacement Theory of Illusion and closes with how this account could enhance contemporary research in epistemology and perceptual theory.