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Civil War History 50.1 (2004) 76-77



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Lee's Cavalrymen: The History of the Mounted Forces of the Army of Northern Virginia. By Edward G. Longacre. (Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 2002. Pp. 480. Cloth, $36.95.)

Edward G. Longacre is no stranger to the history of cavalry in the Civil War. His previous studies of Union cavalry and a tactical analysis of cavalry operations during the Gettysburg campaign place him in the forefront of a small group of historians focused on this aspect of the war. Longacre's latest study chronicles the history of Confederate cavalry in Lee's Army of Northern Virginia.

Lee's Cavalrymen covers every major campaign involving the Army of Northern Virginia with minimal coverage of events in the Shenandoah Valley. In doing so, Longacre gives equal coverage not only to senior cavalry commanders, but also to the men in the ranks and the units in which they served. Numerous [End Page 76] unpublished sources, including letters, diaries, and memoirs provide a window into how the cavalry operated within Lee's army and the relationships forged between the officers and their men. The leadership qualities of lesser-known senior commanders, including William "Grumble" Jones, Thomas T. Munford, and Beverly H. Robertson, are carefully considered.

Not surprisingly, analysis of Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart's command courses throughout Lee's Cavalrymen. Longacre distances himself from the mythology surrounding Stuart's personal character and his effectiveness as a cavalry commander. Longacre carefully considers Stuart's supposed failure to keep Lee informed of the location of Union forces during the Gettysburg campaign. He is quick to point out that the planned junction between Stuart and the advanced force of Gen. Richard Ewell did not have a timetable and that Lee did have a mounted force with him under the command of Beverly Robertson. According to Longacre, there is also no evidence that a bitter confrontation between Stuart—who arrived at camp on July 2—and Lee ever took place.

Though Confederate cavalry under Stuart scored numerous victories in 1861 and 1862, Longacre finds some deficiencies. According to Longacre, "Stuart's men never developed a consistently effective body of tactics" (336). Confederate cavalry fought "according to prewar military tradition," which relied on horsemanship and mounted fighting. Though these tactics proved successful early on, experienced Union cavalrymen willing to utilize dismounted tactics effectively disrupted Confederate cavalry operations later in the war. When Stuart was mortally wounded at Yellow Tavern in 1864, Wade Hampton assumed command of the Confederate cavalry. Only then, Longacre argues, did they adopt the more pragmatic tactics that succeeded at Haw's Shop and Trevilian Station.

Such criticism does not, however, diminish Stuart's importance to the success of Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. Stuart's place in the Confederate pantheon is grounded in his image as a flamboyant general whose raids sparked fear and uncertainty behind enemy lines. Longacre, however, argues that Stuart's real contribution to the Confederate cause was "his unerring ability to provide his superiors with precise, accurate, timely intelligence from which they could deduce both their enemy's movements and intentions" (289).

Readers will find Longacre's interpretation of Lee's Cavalrymen both informative and entertaining. By demystifying Stuart and his command, Longacre provides a clearer picture of the role played by Confederate cavalry in the Army of Northern Virginia. More importantly, Longacre's thorough analysis of the internal operations of Confederate cavalry offers a better understanding of both the successes and failures of the Army of Northern Virginia throughout the war.



Kevin M. Levin
Charlottesville, Virginia



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