Santayana’s Amphibious Concepts
- Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy
- Indiana University Press
- Volume 49, Number 2, Spring 2013
- pp. 238-249
- Additional Information
Santayana might be surprised to learn that he was not an epiphenomenalist, yet a careful examination of his writings yields evidence that epiphenomenalism is but one of two views of the relation between matter and consciousness that his philosophy is equipped to support. The second view has been overlooked by Santayana’s most careful readers. It is largely undeveloped, but it promises to shed much-needed light on the mind-body problem. When fleshed out, the second view avoids the conundrums associated with epiphenomenalism, while preserving the experienced difference between mental and physical realities as well as the experienced compatibility between them.