The Origins and Development of Executive Branch Czars

The problems that President Barack Obama inherited when he took office in 2009—two wars abroad, and at home an economic crisis with possible collapse of the auto industry, the meltdown of the banking sector and housing market—generated expectations that he would take resolute action. With strong partisan majorities in Congress and the traditional leeway in public opinion during the “honeymoon” period, Obama had an unusual combination of circumstances that enabled him to act boldly on a number of policy fronts.

During actual and perceived crises, there is little sentiment to constrain a president’s powers. Obama acted quickly and put into place a number of officials who could assist in responding to crises by coordinating policy responses within the executive branch. Some of those officials have been commonly referred to as “czars” and they have become controversial given that they are usually in unconfirmed positions and yet exercise considerable powers.

For example, to deal with the effects of the automobile industry financial crisis in March 2009, Obama appointed an auto recovery czar, Ed Montgomery.¹ The president tasked Montgomery with directing billions of federal dollars to communities most affected by the near-collapse of the industry. Obama described Montgomery’s enormous responsibilities: “[Montgomery] will direct a comprehensive effort that will help lift up the hardest-hit areas by using the unprecedented levels of funding available in our Recovery Act and throughout our government to create new manufacturing jobs and new businesses where they’re needed most.”²

Two months later Obama issued an executive order that created a new White House Council on Automotive Communities and Workers, with the auto recovery czar directing and coordinating its activities.³ The council consisted of eleven cabinet secretaries, the attorney general, and numerous other high-level government officials—whose activities in the auto-recovery area would all be under the direction of Montgomery. Obama created the council as a temporary entity, set to expire in two years, and specified that it would have a variety of policy and budgetary powers, including coordinating economic recovery assistance at all levels of the federal system.

This czar position highlights the troubles with such an arrangement. The president appointed an official, not subject to confirmation, to lead a newly created executive branch entity that had no statutory guidance, and provided him with responsibility for determining the distribution of large sums of public funds and coordinating policy among multiple departments and agencies. When Montgomery resigned in 2010, the president replaced him with two officials: a Senate-confirmed secretary of another department and an unconfirmed czar. These arrangements came about not due to any constitutional-based understanding, but merely because the president unilaterally decided.

Indeed, there is no official title of executive branch “czar” in the U.S. Constitution, federal laws, or government manuals. The very word “czar” seems inappropriate in a constitutional republic. There is no commonly accepted definition of the term, although a helpful starting point is posed by James Pfiffner, who describes czars as “members of the White House staff who have been designated by the president to coordinate a specific policy that involves more than one department or agency in the executive branch; they do not hold Senate confirmed positions; nor are they officers of the United States.”⁴

Czars can certainly be found within the White House, which provides them with some protection from congressional oversight; however, czars are also located within a department, agency, or some unknown location. Some have even had dual appointments—as a part of the White House staff and also within a department or agency.⁵ In all three scenarios, many czars have made significant policy, regulatory, and budgetary decisions while operating independently of the normal constraints built into our constitutional system. In a system of government that seeks to prevent tyranny by ensuring that each branch can check the others, there are dangers in allowing executive branch officials with far-reaching powers to be isolated from legislative oversight and controls.⁶

It is a long recognized principle that presidents cannot fulfill their many...