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Hispanic American Historical Review 84.1 (2004) 182-183



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Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 Constitution. By Robert Barros. Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy. Cambridge University Press, 2002. Tables. Bibliography. Index. xviii, 349 pp. Cloth, $65.00. Paper, $25.00.

Much of the literature on the Chilean military government (1973-90) emphasizes the highly personalist nature of the regime constructed after the 1973 coup that ousted Salvador Allende. Robert Barros challenges this characterization, arguing that the division of power among the branches of the armed forces, and between the Junta (acting as legislature) and the president, made General Augusto Pinochet's dominance much less complete than other scholars have suggested. Instead, Barros insists that cohesion and stability of the military regime rested on "a collegial organization of power that was institutionalized through rules and procedures which protected and reinforced the original plural foundation of military rule" (p. 4).

He grounds this conclusion in careful and extensive review of internal documents of the military regime. Archival research is supplemented by interviews with key civilian officials in the military government, retired and active-duty military officers, lawyers, judges, constitutional theorists, and opposition politicians and activists. Chronological analysis of political and legal debates on many different issues within the government from the early 1970s to 1989 permits Barros to detail the extensive "pluralism" within the dictatorship that impeded Pinochet's full consolidation of personalist rule. The Constitutional Tribunal's 4-3 ruling insisting on the creation of a tribunal to oversee the constitutionally mandated plebiscite of 1988 (to decide if Pinochet should continue as president) is one of many examples provided to illustrate that, in addition to the Junta's constraints on Pinochet, the Junta itself came to be constrained by the constitution it had promulgated.

A brief history of the Supreme Court's abdication of authority to review decisions of military courts "in time of war," and the Junta's incorporation of this judicial self-evisceration into the 1980 constitution at the urging of regime ideologue Jaime Guzmán, explicitly reminds readers that pluralism within the Junta did not protect average citizens from massive human-rights violations. Barros's main point is not that "military constitutionalism" impeded arbitrary and brutal repression—only that the military regime was less personalist and more pluralist internally than suggested by other researchers. [End Page 182]

Barros presents convincing evidence that the internal workings of the Junta, the distinct corporate interests of the three branches of the armed forces and the national police, and differences of opinion within the civilian political Right sometimes constrained Pinochet's power. As sometimes occurs with revisionist arguments, however, the central thesis is somewhat overstated. Barros apparently did not have access to a recent and important study of the military regime, Carlos Huneeus's El regimen de Pinochet (Sudamericana, 2000). Huneeus agrees with Barros that corporate representation of the armed forces and police within the Junta constrained Pinochet to some extent. But the title of his 650-plus page book is, nevertheless, The Pinochet Regime. Pinochet was president and army commander, he came to have exclusive control over the secret police, and from 1974 he was officially "jefe supremo de la nación," then president. Personalization of the regime was manifest in the language of the 1978 plebiscite in which Chileans were asked to vote "yes" or "no" as to whether they supported General Pinochet against the United Nations' condemnation of Chile's human-rights violations. The government claimed that over 75 percent of voters supported Pinochet, and Jaime Guzmán declared that the "victory" made Pinochet "the symbol and leader of the regime." In July 1978, Pinochet ousted his principal nemesis on the Junta, Air Force general Gustavo Leigh, with the support of the two other Junta members. No effective challenge to Pinochet's leadership emerged in the next decade.

As Barros's archival research and interviews reveal, there were indeed disagreements on many legal and constitutional issues within the military government, and Pinochet's preferences did not always prevail. In practice, however...

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