Abstract

Hume's arguments in the Treatise require him to employ not only the copy principle, which explains the intrinsic properties of perceptions, but also a thesis that explains the representational content of a perception. I propose that Hume holds the semantic copy principle, which states that a perception represents that of which it is a copy. Hume employs this thesis in a number of his most important arguments, and his doing so enables him to answer an important objection concerning the status of the copy principle. I further argue that the semantic copy principle is necessary, a priori, and discovered through an analysis of our general idea of representational content.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1947-9921
Print ISSN
0319-7336
Pages
pp. 23-54
Launched on MUSE
2013-08-23
Open Access
No
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