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humanities 129 university of toronto quarterly, volume 73, number 1, winter 2003/4 the latter intelligible to an undergraduate. Michael Payne=s essay on >Fur Trade Historiography= offers an excellent introduction to the shifting ground of historical writing in the area, but one needs more. Even a simple chronicle of dates and events would be useful. Further, one could wish that the genuinely interesting and useful discussions of marriage practices within the fur trade by Jennifer S.H. Brown and Heather Rollason Driscoll could have brought to bear some consciousness of the European history of marriage. The phrase >tender ties,= used in reference to the connection of fur trader and his >country wife,= is insufficiently informed by a larger sense of history. De Rougemont=s argument, for example, that love is peculiar to Islamic and Christian cultures could be significant when considering the implications of a European=s >turning off= a Native >country wife= for a white European Christian. What were the cultural assumptions of the partners? What confirms or sanctifies human connections of this kind as properly extending beyond sex, children, and material support? Like the book as a whole, these essays and several others are good, but in need of firmer direction and greater clarity. This said, From Rupert=s Land to Canada remains a worthy memorial of a worthy scholar and teacher. (KENNETH M. MCKAY) J.L. Granatstein. Canada=s Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace University of Toronto Press. xvi, 520. $50.00 According to Histor!ca, the business-financed, Toronto-based lobby that favours more Canadian history in the schools, we need to learn more about our military past. Far from a pacifist past, Histor!ca declares in Telling the Story of Canada=s Military History, >Canada=s history is one of never adequately preparing for war, but performing brilliantly when war broke out.= This is partly true. Canada=s peacetime defence arrangements have routinely verged on the ridiculous, yet we have emerged from each of the great wars of the previous century with considerable military credit and on the winning side. What is absent both from Histor!ca and our national historical memory is any understanding of how this seeming miracle was achieved. If consistent neglect of defence pays off in marvellous wartime performance, why worry? Our >Militia Myth= B Canadians are such natural warriors that they don=t have to train and prepare themselves= B is sufficient rebuttal to peacetime advocates of military preparedness. The marvel that most European armed forces are currently little better than Canada=s should be a source of delight to Canadian pacifists and militarists alike. However, any age of miracles has its sceptics. Unlike Histor!ca=s wellheeled adults, smarter kids in history classes may wonder how Canadians were transformed from amateur night performers into the skilled professionals who captured Vimy Ridge in 1917 and who drove deeper 130 letters in canada 2002 university of toronto quarterly, volume 73, number 1, winter 2003/4 than other troops who landed on D-Day, 1944. Historian and defence advocate Jack Granatstein has provided his answer. More than a solid history of Canada=s land forces, Canada=s Army is a well-aimed, six-hundredpage barrage on the Militia Myth. Granatstein=s book is not, of course, an attack on the Canadian militia. Arguably, the militia has been the biggest single victim of the Canadian militia myth. Why study war when crowds preferred a ceremonial review or a slam-bang sham battle? If equipment was short B and in peacetime it always was B strip the militia of its scout cars for Suez peacekeeping in 1956 and of its Cougars for Bosnia in 1993. American law protects the jobs of National Guard members summoned to serve; what government would dare demand as much from Canadian employers? As early as 1875, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Fletcher told Canadians that defence policy depended on the answers to three questions: how many, how good, and how expensive? Faced with an American threat too big even for the British to face, the government had settled on having forty thousand ill-trained, ill-equipped militia at a million dollars a year. Such a force could keep...


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