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  • Lincoln’s Political Generals by David Work
  • Steve Engle (bio)
Lincoln’s Political Generals. By David Work. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2009. Pp. 287. Paper, $19.95.)

Thanks to the sesquicentennial of the Civil War, scores of books are reexamining thoroughly plowed military history. Yet David Work’s new book about Abraham Lincoln and his colorful cast of political generals is an insightful and provocative volume that expands upon the works of his predecessors, including most recently James McPherson and Thomas Goss. Work reminds us that politics and generalship are not only significantly interconnected but worthy of ongoing inquiry.

Work focuses on sixteen generals—eight Republicans and eight Democrats—whose clout within their own political parties encouraged Lincoln to incorporate them into the administration’s winning fold. The lessons learned from the inescapable blend of politics and military in war [End Page 416] that Lincoln came to appreciate broaden our understanding of his effectiveness as a commander in chief. By using an equal number of Republicans and Democrats, representing several different geographical regions and including the two most popular immigrant groups (Germans and Irish), Work’s study examines lingering questions about Lincoln’s political generals. Beyond the battlefield, how did they handle the world of military operations, conscription, the commercial and business aspects of raising and equipping an army, the enrollment of blacks in the military, and the occupation of vast portions of the southern Confederacy? These generals have been eclipsed by those commanders who had the combat expertise and victories on the battlefield associated with success.

Work suggests that these generals cannot be overlooked or dismissed so easily as a consequence of their lackluster combat performances. They exerted considerable influence over the Federal war effort, he argues, not only because of where they commanded troops, but also because of their efforts away from the battlefield. Ben Butler’s occupation of Maryland helped convince Governor Thomas Hicks to support the Union. Then his occupation of Virginia provided the administration with solutions to the problem of runaway slaves, by employing them in the army, despite the outcries of slave owners and some of Lincoln’s cabinet members. John Frémont’s failure to pin down Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley in June 1862 eclipsed his role in keeping Missouri in the Union the previous summer. Despite his controversial declaration of martial law in that state, which Lincoln revoked and for which Frémont was removed, he linked winning the war to confiscation of southern property, including slaves. Perhaps the most colorful of all the political generals was the German-born Franz Sigel, who won wide acclaim early in the war in the West, especially for his victory at Pea Ridge, and rose meteorically among his compatriots and many native-born Americans despite his poor performances on the battlefields of the eastern theater. Lincoln recognized Sigel’s worth in increasing his own popularity among Germans and in keeping them loyal, not only to the Union but to the Republican Party. Sigel’s value to the administration, perhaps more than that of any other political general in the Union army, appeared to lie more with his constituency than his military prowess.

Lincoln’s political generals were invaluable, Work argues, because they filled a void in high command early in the war, especially in raising, training, and equipping an army that perhaps outgrew them. Given the limited resources of the nation’s military and the small number of professional officers in 1861, it was impossible, Lincoln believed, to wage war without politically appointed generals. He had no reason to doubt these [End Page 417] commanders could prove successful leaders. Some became competent in combat, such as John Logan and James Wadsworth, whereas others, such as Ben Butler, John Frémont, and Franz Sigel, proved mediocre. Most fell somewhere in between. John McClernand, Dan Sickles, Carl Schurz, Robert Schenck, Stephen Hurlbut, Thomas Meagher, and James Shields all succeeded through both their military competence and their leadership abilities. Whether they were great generals or not, they remained committed to the cause and provided Lincoln with the support he needed throughout the war, even when they disagreed with his views or policies.

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