China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations under Chen Shui-bian (review)

In March 2000, Chen Shui-bian, candidate of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), won the presidential election in Taiwan. He defeated the Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT) candidate Lien Chan, James Soong running as an independent, and two other candidates. The KMT, which had ruled Taiwan for more than half a century, was out of power. The party that from its inception had advocated Taiwan's independence from China was now in power. It was a momentous occasion that had far-reaching implications for Taiwan's domestic politics as well as its external relations.

China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations under Chen Shui-bian is a study of how Chen's win affected China-Taiwan relations, based primarily on an assessment of the reactions of the leaders on both sides. They were not prepared for the event. Chen's victory was unexpected. It happened because Lien and Soong split the conservative vote. Chinese leaders in Beijing wanted Lien or Soong to win, favoring either over Chen. Most observers even in Taiwan did not expect Chen to prevail until late in the campaign. Chen and his party were certainly not well prepared to govern much less deal with cross-Strait matters.

According to Sheng, however, it was not the worst of all worlds for Beijing. China disliked former president Lee Teng-hui so intensely that Chen's victory was not perceived as all that bad, even though he was a famous (or infamous, in Beijing's eyes) advocate of independence for Taiwan (he even put this provision in his party's charter). Attempting to prove this thesis, the author discusses Lee's policies and the actions that caused officials in Beijing to be so angry with him and to distrust him so much. At the top of the list is Lee's July 1999 statement to a German radio station to the effect that China and Taiwan are two separate states and that Beijing should understand this.

Sheng's analysis of this event is penetrating and serves as the backdrop for arguing why Chen's becoming president was at least tolerable to Beijing. The author also points out that Chen made a number of concessions to China during the campaign (although these concessions were central to his effort to get elected since the electorate feared he might provoke conflict with China). When he became president he repudiated many of the tenets of independence that Beijing so disliked and that many feared he might espouse. These concessions made him look reasonable.

But Sheng also argues that this was more a public-relations campaign that Chen had designed for the Western media than it was an attempt to impress China; Chinese leaders, Sheng says, judged Chen almost solely on the criterion of whether he accepted the idea of one China or not—something Chen no doubt knew. And Chen would only commit to this being a topic that should be discussed. Thus, Beijing did not like him. Sheng also notes many innuendos that Chen made and some important policies that favored "Taiwanization," which, to China, revealed his true colors and his support for Taiwan's separation from China.

The author, however, doesn't opine, at least not very strongly, as to where Chen's real feelings and intentions lie. He suggests, and this seems believable, that it doesn't matter since Chen is "flexible" (a term many use to praise him) or is an opportunist (and has no principles). This is certainly true inasmuch as the leaders in Beijing don't know exactly how to deal with him. But they also feel that they don't need to since time is on their side. Sheng, on the other hand, views China's reaction to Chen as restrained because of the Chinese government's desire to maintain equanimity in its relations with the United States so...