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  • Internal Enemies:Facets and Representations under State Terrorism
  • Jorge Montealegre (bio)
    Translated by Lena Taub Robles (bio)

I attempt to offer a fragment of a response to the disturbing question concerning how individuals face adversity as "prisoners of war" and the difficulty of mourning.1 I will approach the issue considering the situation of political imprisonment of activists—both men and women—considered "internal enemies" by Latin American dictatorships.

Without freedom, there was a time when uncertainty clouded the biographies of those people, darkened their hope, and instilled an intimate restlessness. I think about the folds of each word, and I ask myself about those other internal enemies that the internal enemy had to face to survive in the political prison. It is likely that the aftermath of defeat or of the fall in prison—with its violence, imprisonment, humiliation—incubates an internal opposing force; the disappointment that is embodied in the experience of adversity, that must also be faced and overcome to continue living.

What other kind of internal enemies has military violence left in the southern [End Page 189] cone of our America? To try to respond (to myself), I share the central aspects of the inquiry I made on community resilience in the political prison of men and women in Chile and Uruguay. Inevitably, it is a personally disturbing question that I also try to answer from my own experience as an ex-political prisoner: a "prisoner of war," according to my captors. Thus, this essay is the result of an intrinsic motivation that has led me to investigate and seek a better understanding of this phenomenon that transcends my individual experience, with the willingness of understanding more complex collective processes.

The Condor Summit

In April 1976, the dictators of Chile and Uruguay met in Montevideo.2 They awarded each other, they dedicated speeches and declared their respective "ideals of authentic nationalism": gestures and words that claimed a sui generis democratic spirit. Augusto Pinochet, the guest of honor, affirmed: "our countries have suffered the action of Marxism Leninism and offer a true example of democracy." The host, Juan María Bordaberry agreed: "our republics are willing to maintain their ideal of democratic life. But they have become aware that it is not to be confused with the mere form of government known as democracy."3 It was the Condor summit.

On the day of Pinochet's arrival in Montevideo, the Chilean Chancellery informed that "the visit is of utmost importance given the strongly anti-Marxist character of both governments, and in this context, both leaders will analyze the security measures that are necessary to deal with subversion, terrorism, guerrillas, and infiltration."4 The counterinsurgency coordination took shape and the Condor Plan was deployed without limits.

State terrorism acts across borders and extends collaboration between dictatorships. It is organized and operates in response to a design that transcends local governments. Inside, in addition to the emblematic cases of international repercussion, everyday repression that affects an anonymous population living in each country. They then live under the suspicion of being an internal enemy, according to the common doctrine that guides de facto regimes and extends the Cold War, occupying the southern cone of Latin America with its own national militaries. [End Page 190]

Indoctrination is taught and perfected by the United States through its School of the Americas in Panama, dedicated to the formation of allies in combat without quarter or scruples against what was generally understood at that time as communism, extending the notion of enemies also to the inhabitants of each country: the communist or subversive as "internal enemy" that supposedly responds to foreign interests. This view of the enemy does not focus solely on men or on a regular or irregular military force: potentially, the enemy can be a whole family, including men, women and children.

This doctrine, Miguel Rojas Mix explained, "is based on the fact that given the enormous technological development that modern war involves, only the United States can assume the defense of the hemisphere. Hence, by severing the function of defending the country from the external enemy, local armies are reduced to purely maintaining internal security." Rojas Mix added, "internal security can...

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