Abstract

Here, Tom Tillemans revisits his 2009 article "How do Mādhyamikas Think" and once again argues for a limited dialetheism that could apply to certain early Buddhist texts. The contradictions would only be of a non-adjunctive variety, that is, there would be assertions of p and assertions of not-p, but never of p and not-p. A non-adjunctive dialetheism would further Madhyamaka's quietism, in that the same asserted statements would also be negated, thus leaving little possibility for the Buddhist to hold a philosophical thesis as to how things are. On the other hand, adjunction of p with not-p would naturally tend to result in the quasi-Hegelian position that things are in fact contradictory. It is not clear that the adjunctive dialetheism of Deguchi, Garfield, and Priest could further a quietist Madhyamaka philosophy.

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