Reassessing Unnatural Narratology: Problems and Prospects

In this article, we outline a critique of the program for an unnatural narratology recently proposed by Jan Alber, Stefan Iversen, Henrik Skov Nielsen, and Brian Richardson in their 2010 article “Unnatural Narratives, Unnatural Narratology: Beyond Mimetic Models.” The authors claim to have outlined “the basic theoretical framework of what [they] would like to call ‘unnatural narratology,’” to have provided “a definition of the term ‘unnatural,’” and to have sketched their “aims and goals” in articulating the program for research described in their article (129). Despite these claims, however, it is no easy task to pinpoint the tenets of the unnaturalists.

The title “Unnatural Narratives, Unnatural Narratology: Beyond Mimetic Models” suggests two different topics. We are to expect discussion of unnatural narratives and of unnatural narratology. In both cases mimetic models are to be transcended. While the headings of the first two sections of the article (“Narrative and the Unnatural” and “The Aims of Unnatural Narratology”) conform to this organizational scheme, the text itself does not. As we will show, the authors in fact give a wide spectrum of differing theses without indicating which of these theses or claims they are actually prepared to defend. In this essay we try to sort through the claims at issue and to test at least some of them for their plausibility. In doing so, we will also discuss more general questions about the scope and aims of narratology itself. We stress at the outset that we believe that the approach (or framework for inquiry) that calls itself unnatural narratology can be fruitful and lead to interesting results. That said, the programmatic article by Alber, Iversen, Nielsen, and Richardson prompts us to call for a clarification of some of the unnaturalists’ central terms, to question some of their stronger claims, and to correct some of the expectations that their account creates—namely, what we take to be exaggerated expectations about the conclusions that can be reached via the coauthors’ approach.

We distinguish four types of theses put forward by Alber et al. (2010):

1. 1. Theses concerning the existence of narrative texts containing unnatural elements as well as the definition of the concept of the “unnatural” itself.

2. 2. General theses concerning the interpretation of narrative texts containing unnatural elements.

3. 3. Theses concerning a new type of (or direction/paradigm for) narratology.

4. 4. Theses concerning the interpretation of the specific examples the authors provide.

In Alber et al.’s (2010) account, type (4) theses are used to establish type (2) or (3) theses. In this article, we will not devote extensive discussion to type (4) theses concerning the interpretation of specific texts—although we will contest some of Alber et al.’s claims about particular texts along the way. Instead, our focus will be on type (1), (2), and (3) theses, which we will discuss in turn.

Theses Concerning the Existence of Unnatural Narrative Texts and the Definition of the Concept of the “Unnatural”

Alber et al. (2010) propose only one thesis concerning the existence of unnatural texts.

(A) Many narratives contain unnatural elements.¹

This thesis looks trivially true, and given some convenient notion of “unnatural” it probably is. So while thesis (A) is not problematic, one would like to know what the criteria are for counting an element as unnatural. As we discuss below, the authors provide a definition that actually reads like an example (115), hinting that it should be taken as part of a range of possible definitions but without discussing alternatives.

According to the example/definition given by the authors, unnatural narratives are “anti-mimetic texts that violate the parameters of traditional realism (‘Beyond Story’) or move beyond the conventions of natural narrative, i.e., forms of spontaneous oral storytelling (Unnatural Voices)” (Alber et al. 2010: 115). One shouldn’t take this definition at face value, however. Not only does it leave open whether necessary or sufficient conditions are at stake; what is more, it potentially makes all written, let alone literary, narrative unnatural: All written narratives move “beyond the conventions of [. . .] spontaneous oral storytelling” in various ways, which means that...