Abstract

This essay deals with a selected part of an epistemological controversy provided by ṣūusī in response to the skeptical arguments reported by Rāzī that is related to what might be called "intellectual skepticism," or skepticism regarding the judgments of the intellect, particularly in connection with self-evident principles. It will be shown that Rāzī has cited and exposed a position that seems to be no less than a medieval version of empiricism. ṣūusī, in contrast, has presented us with a position that rejects such empiricism. The comparative aim of this essay is to draw attention to some similarities as well as some points of divergence between the kind of skeptical debate we are focusing on here, and some relevant epistemological discussions in the later traditions in the West.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1529-1898
Print ISSN
0031-8221
Pages
pp. 213-250
Launched on MUSE
2013-05-09
Open Access
No
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