Alfred von Schlieffen's Military Writings (review)

Translations are always difficult. One can always quibble over the meaning of this or that phrase, particularly when translating German into English. With a language as multivalent as German, much depends on context. Paradoxically, context has no clearly definable limit. That notwithstanding, Robert Foley has produced a worthwhile translation of several of Count Alfred von Schlieffen's key texts. The book is organized into three parts. Part I (Wargames) includes five of Schlieffen's general staff rides (1894, 1897, 1899, 1901, 1903), four of his tactical-strategic problems (1892, 1896, 1903, 1905), and his important 1905 Kriegsspiel. Part II (Memoranda) contains four of his official memoranda: the 1905 Report on the Russian army; the Memorandum of 1905, referred to as the Schlieffen Plan; the 1906 Addendum to the Memorandum; and the younger Moltke's 1911 Comments to the Memorandum. Part III (Theoretical Writings) includes Schlieffen's essays published in Deutsche Revue: "War of Today" (1909), "The Feldherr" (1910), and "Million-Man Armies" (1911); as well as his introduction to Cannae Studies, and his speech on the commemorative anniversary of the elder Moltke's birthday.

The work has a brief but useful introduction describing the power matrix—some might say labyrinth—in which Schlieffen found himself during his tenure as chief of the German general staff (1891-1905) and the challenges, both strategic and operational, that he had to overcome in order to improve Germany's chances of winning the next war. Foley paints a fairly accurate picture of a man—and an organization—that had responsibility for war planning, but had no direct control over doctrine, training, or the establishment of the size of the Imperial German army. Thus, Schlieffen's focus on the training and education (even indoctrination) of his staff emerges as his only recourse for ensuring that the Kaiser's army would be intellectually prepared for the next war. Hence, the importance of Schlieffen's writings.

Each of the work's parts includes a brief introduction explaining the significance of the role of its particular subject matter. Regrettably, in his discussion of Schlieffen's 1905 Memorandum, Foley does not comment on the debate between Terence Zuber and Terence Holmes over the "Schlieffen Plan," except to state, correctly, that the 1905 Memorandum left behind by Schlieffen was merely a sketch and not a finished plan, as Gerhard Ritter, the noted critic of the "plan," assumed.

Serious scholars, as always, will want to refer to Schlieffen's writings in the original German. Students, on the other hand, will find Foley's translations quite useful. They will be perplexed at times, however, because Foley chooses not to annotate or, in some cases, even to translate, a number of phrases that would make Schlieffen's writing more accessible to modern readers. In "War of Today," for example, Foley does not clarify the phrase: "[England] will have better things to do than to allow its army to be arrested in Schleswig according to Bismarck's direction." Schlieffen is, of course, referring to Bismarck's famous comment that if the British army were to invade Schleswig, he would send the Berlin police to arrest it. Foley also chooses not to translate the French term "milliards" (thousands of millions, or billions) in the same essay. While this volume will make Schlieffen's writings more accessible, greater attention to particular phrases and words that experienced historians take for granted would have made it even more so.