Identity Politics and the Civil War: The Transformation of South Carolina’s Public History, 1862–2012

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Several episodes, almost a quarter of a century apart, reveal the continuing power of identity politics in South Carolina history. How much difference has 150 years made in how people publicly relate, and relate to, their past in the Palmetto State? The sesquicentennial of the American Civil War has brought the question to the fore all over those portions of the United States whose citizens fought. Yet in South Carolina, frequently regarded as the epicenter of the conflict, the question has not had as much resonance as it might. This is because people in the state in effect have taken a post-modern turn in their presentation of the war. Rather than synthesize and integrate the story of the conflict and its implications, from the run-up to secession through Reconstruction, many consumers, commemo- rators, commentators, and reenactors instead focus on the elements of the history with which they identify. That often also means ignoring, scoring, or scorning other elements.

Now, it may be doubted that most Sons of Confederate Veterans or participants in the 54th Massachusetts reenactment troop think of themselves as postmodern. The point isn’t that any particular group is, but rather that the results of these competing, present-day perceptions and narratives of the Civil War are multiple, fragmented, subjectified, and personalized. The holders of these competing views may assert and believe the truth of their particular personalizations, which they want to share at the next reenactment. That decision sent him to jail for some time. Thankfully, the Society ultimately recovered the hurt done us. They were dismayed that these thefts might tarnish the reputation of their troop’s good men and the memory of the soldiers whom they honored for having fought so gallantly 125 years before. There were tears in their eyes.

The sincerity of the men was palpable. Yet, when I asked why, in their judgment, this episode had occurred, they had trouble answering. They didn’t understand how personal investment, involvement, and identity, as well as ego and pride, had undermined their commander’s adherence to the standards that they had committed themselves to honor and uphold. These delegation members fused honor and identity, almost equating them.

Fast forward to a small conference in Columbia, South Carolina, a couple of years ago. Most in attendance were dumbfounded by a passionate paper presented there by an adjunct professor of literature with both a doctorate in English and a divinity degree. It attacked the Union cause, presence, and impact in South Carolina 150 years ago. The paper was filled with hurt and bitterness. That was what was surprising, not the neo-Confederate argument, a local staple. So heated and angry was the paper that the author leapt to breathtaking conclusions. For instance, he blamed General Sherman, leader of the Union army’s march through South Carolina, for laying the groundwork for global warming and the progressive depopulation of a once edenic South. This is because, the argument went, he was the leading edge of both the invasion of the South and world dominance by capitalist, exploitative, industrial Yankees. Furthermore, the listeners were told, Sherman’s practice of total war visited a depth and degree of horror on the South that no other civilized people had endured. No modern people had had their culture attacked in that violent, comprehensive fashion.

The speaker that day was a member of the South Carolina League of the South. One finds this argument suffusing the website of the organization (SCLoS.org). Most people who hold neo-Confederate views may not support the organization’s purpose, stated on the masthead of the League’s newsletter: “Advocating the Sovereignty and Independence of the State of South Carolina.” Not all would think wise the deliberately charged language of the article, “The Red Shirts Ride Again,” in the Autumn 2010 issue of the South Carolina Patriot. The piece reports that the organization’s chairman “put out a call for the Red Shirts [or members] to ride … to defend a brave lady in Summerville,” South Car-
olina, who had “placed a Confederate flag on the front of her house” in “a predominantly black neighborhood.” The counter protest, mounted by the Red Shirts, was against a march by “ignorant black bigots,” called “for Saturday morning 16 October.” The seventy or so African Americans were joined by “two South hating whites.” On the other hand, joining the thirty Red Shirts “from Charleston, Aiken, Lexington, Abbeville, Columbia, Summerville and elsewhere” was H. K. Edgerton of North Carolina. He famously is “the black man who dresses in a Confederate uniform and carries a large Confederate flag to protest against anti-Confederate flag groups everywhere.” The day was judged a good one, gaining the organization “three new members.”

It is easy to characterize such actions and language as expressions of a fringe group. Yet the member who spoke at the conference several weeks before the Red Shirts rode again was passionate in his convictions. Of course, Albigensians of the 13th century, the Sephardic Jews and the Byzantines of the 15th century, the Huguenots of the 17th century, the Acadians of the 18th century, and 20th-century Armenians, Ukrainians, Bosnians, Jews, and many others in Europe and America, not to mention other places of “civilization,” would have disagreed with the judgment about the relative damage done the South in the American Civil War. After all, the Confederates did not suffer either physical annihilation or expulsion. In the face of the anguished and clearly warped view of the comparative degree of southern losses and suffering, the natural, first response is disbelief. The second is dismissal. However natural, both are wrong. The passion was real, even if the claims based on it were exaggerated and extreme.

The historian’s job is to deal with the evidence, not ignore what is distasteful or, at first blush, incomprehensible. The historian’s job is to deal with the evidence, but the commitment to group history. In this approach, history ultimately is about identity. Where there are multiple identities there are multiple histories. On the sesquicentennial of the Civil War in South Carolina, therefore, there are different histories for different audiences. That is an important fact to recognize but an unsatisfactory state of affairs.

It wasn’t always so. Up to the centennial of the Civil War, the state had a ruling master narrative. It was the Confederate one. Other perspectives could be glimpsed in a few public places—for instance, at Fort Sumter National Monument in Charleston Har-

The National Park Service’s 1952 booklet on Fort Sumter’s history, however, eschewed large-scale interpretation. Its author chose instead to focus narrowly on the role of the site in the battles for and around Charleston. That approach avoided overt challenge of the Confederate narrative.

This account had multiple components. It emphasized states’ rights and the threat to those rights by the Republican Party. It then argued for the legality and necessity of secession, insisting that the Civil War was provoked by the North and constitutionally should not have occurred; for secession was a right of each state. Turning from the justness of the cause to the conduct of the war, the narrative wove together the heroism against huge odds and the private suffering of the Confederate army and people, on the one hand, and the brutality and rapacity of the Union invaders, on the other hand. Confederate women were celebrated for their sacrifices and service and the men for their honor and bravery.

In this telling, slaves and slavery hardly figured among the causes of the war, although curiously abolitionists and abolitionism did. Instead, the slaves were hapless victims, freed to endure privation and to be misled by corrupt politicians among the black and white Republican leadership during Reconstruction. The departure of the federal army and the restoration of white rule under Democratic leadership returned order, sanity, and light to a world that had been in darkness, madness, and chaos for the previous dozen years and more. Small doses of violence, as the Ku Klux Klan and Hampton’s Red Shirts had to use, served to effect and protect this restoration.

Underlying this narrative was a Manichean split between good Southerners and bad Yankees. Southern culture was built on noble aspirations, traditions, and commitments; Yankee culture on commerce, greed, and calculation. Southern nationalism defended itself against northern imperialism. Southerners celebrated, and rose to defend, local self-determination against the tyranny of centralization and distant control. Northerners pushed consolidation and centralized power with the determination to suffocat southern freedom.

Southerners and Northerners both had become Americans, but Northerners in this interpretation had turned away from the founding fathers’ skepticism of power. Their embrace of the newest and most pernicious and extreme “isms,” modernity, and industry perverted and polluted the government, the land, and their souls. Southerners’ care for their country and principles largely protected Dixie from such developments. The southern people—for they always had been different from Northerners in their origins, values, and priorities—needed to remember their heritage and resist these alien influences, the bad fruit of corrosive Yankee encroachment. Not all had or would, but true Southerners could be counted on. These faithful citizens were those devoted to their region’s defense—Confederates and their descendents and sympathizers.

Absent in this narrative or relegated to supporting roles—that, for instance, of loyal and loving slaves—were African Americans, Unionists, deserters, anti-Confederates, and Republicans. These had white Southerners and blacks should not have had self-determination as their right at any time. That belonged properly only to true Southerners, who managed progressively to restrict the franchise to loyal citizens. It was necessary at times to use violence, but eventually new laws and a new constitution reduced that need. Yet vigilance continued to be vital.

Clearly, this historical narrative is about an ethnic and national, as well as an ideological identity: Southerners had particular origins in common and had developed their own culture on the basis of shared commitments and conditions. The assumption behind this nationalist reading is that history is a patriotic pursuit and duty, as well as a school for citizenship. One uses history to assert and maintain a people-hood (or, in the case of a polity, nationhood). It may be that, by doing so, one is calling the nation or the people into being—that is, enacting ethnogenesis. Or one may be fighting to keep the nation or people from being attenuated or submerged by time, hostile others, and alien cultural influences. Even when one writes and speaks about the past, one does so for the future: long live the nation (or the people)!

This southern nationalist narrative had antebellum roots but did not become hegemonic or totalizing, either in South Carolina or elsewhere in the South, until after the Civil War. Earlier, whites advanced diverse arguments about the future that they saw for the South. There were those who maintained that the southern states’ interests had never been served by the Union; those who insisted instead that the balance of interests was shifting from favorable to unfavorable; those who argued alternatively that the rise of antislavery doomed the Union; those who focused rather on the danger to southern rights
posed by the North’s accelerating growth and political power; those who held that these other developments were less important than the fact that Southerners were becoming strong enough to stand on their own as a separate people and country, and those who preferred to think that Southerners always had been, or at least had become, a distinct people, and therefore, should have a distinct policy: Only a small minority of opinion makers held any of these views in the 1820s, but a large majority of the South Carolina voting population embraced them in one or another combination by December 1860.

How was history deployed in the development of these arguments? Many speakers, and also the drafters of secession declarations, basically said that they were following the example of their Revolutionary forefathers. This was an effort to preserve the rights defended in 1776 and once again under serious threat in 1860. In the case of the “Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union,” the focus then shifted to the breach of the constitutional contract by northern states, which refused to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act. This was the ideological and lawyerly argument. Yet its framers were careful not to justify their cause in the philosophical terms used by Thomas Jefferson and the other drafters of the Declaration of Independence. As the secessionists were acutely aware, in the hands of abolitionists the language of universal rights had become a weapon against slavery. In part, this is why the secession declarations do not make similarly stirring reading, despite their repeated evocations of the Revolutionary past.

The framers of 1860-61 were acutely aware as well of what they deemed the biblical, legal, and historical sanctioning of slavery. They did not feel the need to elaborate but assumed those grounds when insisting that they were protecting this time-honored and divinely approved institution against the radical, unhistorical claims of northern abolitionists—people committed hubristically to human equality and perfectionism in the face of both all the evidence to the contrary and common sense. Those neo-Con federates who deny, as most do, that slavery was a core issue for secession ignore these arguments. Other speakers and writers in 1860-61 insisted that history first may have justified union but no longer did so because of the divergent economic and social developments of the two regions. When South Carolinian William Henry Trescot, acting Secretary of State in the Buchanan administration in 1860, spoke of a government of class and race in South Carolina and the broader region, he was making a variation of the argument. He also looked at the decline or breakup of parts of empires in his day and concluded that rising interests, such as those of southern planters, could—and eventually should—successfully assert self-determination in the face of inimical and distant powers intent on ruling rather than enabling them. This was what had happened in the American Revolution, a conflict at least as much about the self-empowerment of Americans as about inherited political rights from fictive Gothic ancestors. In this spirit, the economist J.D.B. DeBow edited a journal for most of the fifteen years before the Civil War and beyond devoted to the southern economic and its political implications and claims.

Still other writers and speakers pointed to the emergence of ethnic nationalism in Europe and, at the same time as they worried about the liberal and socialist tendencies of the revolutions, urged that the South follow suit. In making their case, these proponents often claimed different origins for Southerners—for instance, descent from the Normans, not the Anglo-Saxons, or from the Cavalier loyalists to the Crown in the English Civil War, not the Puritans, who both peopled New England and were the backbone of the Roundhead army that overthrew the monarchy. William Gilmore Simms, preeminent southern man of letters in the middle third of the 19th century, generally resisted such language about origins, as his justification for a southern nation was different: peoples (he often called them “races”) emerged out of the melding of earlier peoples, as the English had out of the mingling of Normans and Anglo-Saxons, and that was what was happening in the South. Similarly, he held that Northerners were becoming a distinct people. Their attitudes toward Southerners reflected and made ever more disagreeable the difference. It was the job of the historian to trace these developments, anticipate their consequences, and thereby protect and project his people. History was thus a visionary pursuit and, therefore, the proper study of leaders.

History also was fundamental to all these arguments in secession-era South Carolina. What it revealed, of course, depended in considerable degree on the narrator. Yet the narratives tended to the same end—southern independence—regardless of their divergent analyses. The war changed that. Whatever the reasons for asserting independence, the creation of the Confederacy meant that southern nationalism almost instantly became a fact in the minds and mouths of a wide range of opinion makers and their audiences. Very quickly this fact was assumed in most media outlets, the classroom, and the pulpit. Strikingly, after the war, Protestant religious leaders in Kentucky, seeking civic and racial order through solidarity with fellow Southerners, claimed Confederate identity for their congregants. This was despite the fact that the bluegrass state had remained in the Union during the conflict.

This Confederate nation within the nation after 1865 meant that all who shared Confederate identity necessarily, like African Americans everywhere, had a form of double consciousness. Southern whites felt themselves a people apart at the same time as they were a part of the nation to which they had returned. This was because they understood themselves to be at once colonially dependent on the North and threatened by African-American economic and political independence. What they wanted instead was African-American independence, white control at home, and equality with (if no longer independence from) the North. The Confederate narrative aggressively asserted these points. It also cast the days before the war as halcyon. The Old South embodied the good and the perduring. Yet the New South had to grow for Southerners to achieve prosperity again. How to value the old while promoting the new? That became the public task of history.

Then, in the wake of World War I, the South’s history became a burden in the eyes of a growing number, not only outside, but within the region. As the emerging anti-lynching campaign and the civil rights movement showed, a legacy of racism and violence belied the Lost Cause myth of the halcyon Old South. Add to this legacy the fact that the South first lost the Civil War, its independence, and huge wealth, then committed to racial and agricultural practices that could not achieve a healthy economy and society, and thereby became, in the eyes of social scientists and journalists, the nation’s chief economic and social problem. This compelling counter-narrative drew historians to the region’s past in dramatic numbers in the quarter century following the centennial of the Civil War. So successful are the claims of the South on the historical community that now some argue that the very concept of the South has become a hindrance to historical understanding.

In making this case, its supporters begin with the observation that the region presupposes the contours of its study. In other words, the subjects that
get privileged relate to the South’s rise and roles. Even when historians are challenging the Confederate narrative, they frequently continue the focus on regional identity and distinctiveness as shapers of people, culture, and perceptions. Or they ask: What traction do southern identity and realities still have? To all appearances, the answer is at once not much and a great deal.

In the divergent narratives of the Civil War sesquicentennial many South Carolinians claim to historicize their identities but do not relate them historically. Confederate identity, in sympathetic tellings, is not about blacks but about a heroic struggle by a wronged people. Black historical narratives also reflect a heroic struggle by a wronged people. Yet the fact that white and black descendants of the Civil War and Reconstruction era share the same stage and similarly structured narratives hardly figures; neither does the mingling of cultures and people that makes the historical legacies of both white and black Carolinians a common, as well as a contested, inheritance.

The impulse to use a historic sense of hurt as a basis for a present claim for justice and recognition is familiar to identity politics at every level. It not only plays out in negotiations over lands claimed by rival peoples, such as the Palestinians and Israelis or the Serbs and Croats, but in much more intimate settings, such as divorce court. In these diverse circumstances, history is a well from which to draw for self-justification and self-assertion. It also serves to rally those with a shared sense of aggrievement. In doing so, it is as much about present concerns as past developments. It may also, like many nationalist histories of the 19th century, be about the future toward which one wants to go.

To postmodernists, such divergent narratives, by and on behalf of different identities and interests, may be the norm. To many historians, however, they are a failing of the enterprise. Historians want identities to be integrated in the past’s telling, not just juxtaposed and defended without serious reference to each other. The past may be a foreign country needing mapping, but it is not a blank screen inviting self-projection in the costumes of different eras. Although that idea may seem naïve to some observers, without it history loses much of its public value. It is reduced to an entertainment, a basis of association in a community of identity, or the grounds for a case being advanced. The Confederate narrative has become all three.

The counterargument of people committed to identity politics in history is clear: no one other than members of the community exploring and sharing its history will tell what needs telling and do it correctly. It is not a question of getting the facts right, but of getting the story right. This judgment is as much about identity with the subject or the cause as with any body of knowledge and discourse. Yet it makes learning from and about people who do not share one’s identity politics virtually impossible. The effort at empathy that underlies the study of the other is radically different from the exercise of sympathy that affiliates someone to oneself or vice versa.

True, it is easy to colonize and appropriate the other, if one is not careful, but empathy is just the beginning, not the end, of historical understanding.

What would happen if in South Carolina present-day subscribers to Confederate history turned their attention to tellers of African-American history and, conversely, if African Americans overcame enough of their anger to consider Confederate-inspired narratives? What might people hear beneath the stridency and patterned presentations? Would the tragedy of history displace in some measure the memory of historic hurt? Might the common ground on which those identity histories have played out emerge in some measure? Might there be in some measure dialogue rather than just a talking past one another? Might history actually become a basis of understanding in addition to a form of assertion?

In such discussions should who one address power inequalities—between Yankees and Confederates, whites and blacks, rich and poor, men and women? How do the fact of power and the tendency to its abuse become a ground for discussion of the wrongs done many in South Carolina? On the other side of the coin, how do the roles of honor and courage give dignity to people in conflict? Or do they? Are there not stories that make meaningful the terrible meaninglessness of both destructive war and the repression of people and their human rights?

Looking beyond identities, is not the history of the Civil War and Reconstruction part of larger developments simultaneously affecting Europe and Asia as well? When in 1861 and 1862 Karl Marx wrote from London for New York and Viennese newspapers about the American Civil War, it was because the war mattered to more than the combatants and the communities from which they came. The impact of the loss of Confederate cotton on English textile mills and their workers was enormous. It put hundreds of thousands out of work.

The consequences of the war for South Carolina and its people, black as well as white, were all the greater. Indeed, they are still playing out. The seemingly endless debate over the flying of the Confederate battle flag at the state house in Columbia is symbolic. True, the flag no longer flies over the capital, as it did for thirty-eight years after its installation in 1925 in the midst of the Civil War centennial and growing civil rights protests. Still, by law, it must be there, in front, together with a monument honoring fallen Confederate soldiers in words by William Henry Trescot. And that is why the NAACP still boycotts the Palmetto State.

Around the corner from the flag, on the east side of the state house, is the sculpture in honor of African Americans. It was commissioned before, but erected the year after, the flag was moved. The juxtaposition is telling and was deliberate. Lead supporters of the flag and of its removal sought thus to give space for the African-American story on the grounds of the capitol, where since 1879 the Confederate dead had been the focus of attention. Yet, while the two histories both now have public places, the memories and identities that the monuments represent are left to talk past rather than with one another.

Otherwise, how could a letter writer to the May 16, 2012 issue of the Charleston City Paper have attacked, as he did, Robert Smalls, the most famous black Carolinian in the Civil War? According to the letter writer, “Smalls was a traitor to the Confederate States of America and the people who reared him and taught him everything he knew.” The assumption that Smalls should have been grateful for his and his family’s enslavement and not seek to escape to freedom seems at the least psychologically obtuse. Many would read the attitude conveyed as appallingly racist as well. Yet such neo-Confederate critics insist that they only are resisting the interpretation of the Civil War imposed by the North. That leads one to wonder: Is that different from whites imposing their interpretation on blacks, or vice versa? Emphasizing the latter point, the letter writer concluded: “my hat is off to Sen. Tillman and others who took our states back from the hell that the so-called union had forced on us.”

One winces. Yet the point is not that these narratives are reprehensible. The past and the development of identities need to be recovered and analyzed. Of course, the histories of identities are as fraught as they are fundamental. How often has the pursuit led to the celebration of the victors at the expense of the losers in internal conflicts, just as neo-Confederates, as well as African Americans and Native Americans, complain? Losses in international conflicts similarly have provoked defeated nations to intense, chauvinistic, historical exortions. France saw this after 1815 and defeat in the Napoleonic Wars and again after 1870-71 and the stunning outcome of the Franco-Prussian War. To a remarkable degree as a result, Bretons, Provençals, and others were marginalized in the story of France’s development. The former kingdom of many peoples became a single people’s kingdom. Breton and Provençal could no longer be taught in schools. Germany saw a not dissimilar harnessing of history after the loss of the First World War. Victory, however, is no protection either. German history before the First War, like English history of the same period, often enough fed jingoism in its public uses as well.

Ethnic patriotism, like other forms of identity politics, often short-circuits the historical enterprise. This matters because of what patriotism motivates. Serbian nationalism lit the fuse that exploded in World War I. Eighty years later it led to ethnic cleansing in much of the former Yugoslavia. Anders Breivik, the Norwegian mass murderer, claimed that
he acted in self defense, because the Norwegian na-
tion, people, and culture are threatened by inimical
immigration policies and the attitudes of Muslims
now in the country. Others on the far Right in Nor-
way agree. They recognize that Breivik understood
himself to be performing a symbolic act, like the
Red Shirts, although they say he went too far.

The tendency in the post-civil rights era in South
Carolina is not to confront history but to wave it like
a flag. That does little to make sense of the enormity
of the Civil War’s and Reconstruction’s impact on
the state. That impact meant change—what it is that
historians presumably measure and analyze, when
not contemplating continuity and its causes. Yet the
visceral feelings about the Civil War’s and Recon-
struction’s consequences mean that change contin-
ues to be read through identity-tinged glasses. South
Carolina will persist in its postmodern presentation
of history as a function of identity politics unless
and until race is no longer a chief basis of identity.

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Civil War in the South, to be followed by a history of
southern identity.

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10 See David Mulhauser-Hansen, “Southern Literary Horizons in Young America: Imaginative Development of a Regional Geog-


13 See, for instance, the August 28, 2011 post from Edward H. Sebesta on H-South.

14 On Hans Kohn, who influenced my early thinking on these matters, see, for instance, Noam Pianko, “Did Kohn Believe in the ‘Kohn Dichotomy’? Reconsidering Kohn’s Journey from The Political Idea of Judaism to the Idea of Nationalism,” Lehigh Instit-

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