In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Mediterranean Quarterly 14.4 (2003) 42-55



[Access article in PDF]

The Critical Nature of U.S. Policy in the Middle East

Stansfield Turner


Anyone at all concerned with the Middle East will be wondering today what the area will look like when the course of postwar Iraq becomes discernible. Obviously the role the United States is expected to play will be critical, but how do we forecast what that will be? A first step is to look back at how our approach to the affairs of the Middle East has evolved to date. From there, we can attempt to extrapolate to the future. For more than fifty years we have paid close attention to the area because of our dependence on it for oil. We have felt the economic sting of artificially inflated oil prices engineered by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). We knew, however, that there were limits to the threat to our well-being of such machinations. After all, the OPEC nations had to live on their sales of oil. At some point of greediness they would drive the world to reducing consumption of oil and to finding alternative sources of energy. The Saudis have long recognized this and kept OPEC from excesses. We have counted on them to do that.

With the events of 11 September, however, the Middle East has taken on a far greater significance for us. There is no upper limit to the amount of damage terrorists may want to do to us. While terrorism can spawn almost anywhere, today most problems with terrorism bear the stamp of the Middle East. The question for us is, how well is the United States prepared to deal with the Middle East as a source of terrorism? A starting point in addressing [End Page 42] this is to look back at how we have interacted with the Middle East since World War II. The history on which we are building today shows that we have moved steadily in two directions in the Middle East: toward a greater U.S. military role in the area and toward more direct involvement in mediating between Israel and the Palestinians.

The initial objective of U.S. policy in the area after World War II was to ensure access to oil at a reasonable price. In turn, that called for political stability in the region. For more than thirty years after the war, we relied in our quest for that stability on the twin pillars of the House of Saud on the south side of the Persian Gulf and the dynasty of the shah of Iran on the north. Our appreciation of the importance of the first of these relationships was reflected in President Franklin D. Roosevelt's making the effort to rendezvous with King Ibn Saud on 14 February 1945. Roosevelt was on his way home by ship from the conference at Yalta. Complications in arranging the meeting reveal how little either party understood the culture of the other. The king was to embark in the U.S. Navy's destroyer Murphy in Jidda and proceed on her to the Great Bitter Lake in the Suez Canal. There he would join the president in the cruiser U.S.S. Quincy. The king's staff arrived at the Murphy with one hundred live, fatted sheep and several tons of vegetables and rice. After delicate negotiations, the king relented and brought aboard only seven sheep, enough to feed his entourage of forty-eight with freshly slaughtered meat. There was a small contretemps when the king's staff attempted to cook on a charcoal brazier atop an ammunition magazine. U.S. sailors had to be taught not to pass in front of their Arab visitors when those visitors were at prayer, lest a shadow be cast between the worshippers and Mecca.

Interestingly, in their discussions the president raised the issue of resettling Jews from Central Europe to Palestine. Ibn Saud responded that instead, the Jews should be given choice properties in the land of their oppressor, Germany. That oppressor should pay, not innocent bystanders...

pdf

Share