Operation Iraqi Freedom and the New Middle East

The war in Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom) and the termination of Saddam Hussein's tyrannical regime have had wide-ranging effects worldwide, but nowhere have they been more immediate than in the Middle East itself, where they have affected all existing issues and all the major states. The quick end of major hostilities accompanied by a generally low level of casualties suggested an opportunity for the United States to use its capability and strength to focus on other regional issues. It has generated an improved opportunity for the resolution of some regional issues and concern among rogue states, terrorist sponsors, and terrorist organizations about their fate. And it has improved Israel's security and its geostrategic position. Among the more salient questions is whether or not the war enhanced the prospects for peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The initial effect was an altered geostrategic situation in the Middle East. For Iran there was the end of a regime that had launched a long and costly war against it in 1980. Nevertheless, Iran continued to develop its nuclear capability and its missile systems. Syria lost its Baathist neighbor with which it had a rocky relationship despite sharing a number of policy perspectives on such issues as the future of Israel. Jordan lost an economic booster but one with different political goals. In the Israeli-Palestinian sector the changes were more complex—the Palestinians lost both a political champion and a financier (especially of suicide bombers), while Israel lost an adamant foe. Iraq had not only joined in several Arab-Israeli wars but also refused to sign armistice or other agreements with Israel, threatened to burn half the country, and in 1991 hit Israel with thirty-nine Scud missiles.

Whatever their concerns elsewhere, for the Bush administration the Arab-Israeli sector of the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict are unique. A clear crisis and a failed process greeted the Bush national security team on taking office. And they chose to stay out of the crisis until the violence stopped, some trust could be restored between Israel and the Palestinians, and there was an opportunity to move toward a clear and attainable goal. The Arab-Israeli conflict did not have a direct and obvious impact on the security and well-being of the United States; there were other, more complex, daunting, and dangerous crises affecting the U.S. national interest. The lack of a significant threat to the United States and the absence of clear prospects for a successful outcome suggested a lowered priority for the Arab-Israeli issue in the Bush administration. The 11 September attacks raised the profile of terrorist groups and their sponsors, and the "axis of evil" speech called attention to the connections among terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), rogue states, and U.S. interests. The war against Saddam's Iraq and the successes there altered the view of the prospects and needs in the region for the Bush foreign and security policy team.

The Ouster of Saddam Hussein

The end of Saddam's regime generated a range of reactions among the regional states and their leaders. Some were concerned that they might be next on the list; others sought to reassess their own geostrategic positions in light of the new reality resulting from the swift and overwhelming U.S. victory. The axis of evil lost one-third of its membership, and the number of regional state sponsors of terrorism was reduced by one-fifth. The ranks of the regional radical states and dictatorial regimes—of rogue states—were depleted. Syria and Iran, two important regional actors (one Arab, one Persian) were now required to reconsider their positions and their postures on a series of issues. Added to their concerns were comments and actions by senior Bush officials (especially Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld) that suggested a potential policy reassessment and perhaps even the use of force to alter regimes and/or policies.

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