Inequality in Latin America and the Quandary of Clientelism

Academics and policy makers have come to a strong consensus that deep and persistent inequalities have shaped the past and present of Latin America and pose a major challenge to social and political improvements in the future. Examining inequality from different angles, the five books under review illustrate that the rising consensus has also advanced more problematic assumptions in regard to both the social and the political behaviors that engender inequality, as well as the policies best suited to promote it. Two of these books—The Legal Foundations of Inequality and Living Standards in Latin American History—are especially productive and innovative, for they provide important insights into patterns of inequality before the mid-twentieth century, a period about which many assumptions are made on the basis of very weak empirical data.

Most notable for its broad comparative approach is Roberto Gargarella’s excellent study of evolving tensions between competing political projects in the nineteenth century and their impact on institutional arrangements that would affect inequality in later years. In Gargarella’s compelling narrative, nineteenth-century political alternatives were embodied in three distinct constitutional projects, which he terms radical, conservative, and liberal. Radicals (and their majoritarian or populist project) successfully mobilized people for independence and democratic ideals, advocating unicameralism; a strict division of powers; direct representation; and limits on the power of the executive, clergy, and military. At the other end of the spectrum, conservatives embraced political elitism and moral perfectionism while pushing for a strong executive, a leading role for the military in achieving internal order, and political centralism against federalism. They also promoted electoral colleges, a judiciary, and a senate. Together, these arrangements aimed to protect property rights from “the ‘ambitions’ and ‘excesses’ of the popular assembly” (127). Finally, liberals presented a middle alternative, challenging both tyranny (the rule of one) and anarchy (the rule of many), but emphasizing that “nothing was as dangerous for personal freedom as the coercive powers of the state and its coercive apparatus” (157). According to Gargarella:

Liberals developed three basic institutional proposals that would become fundamental to the evolution of modern constitutionalism. First, they defended the need to limit the people’s mass and direct participation in public matters. This was based on the assumption that popular bodies would act merely out of irrationality or self-interest. Second, they proposed to increase the existing distance between the representatives and the people, making the former more “independent” and autonomous in their choices. Third, they established a system of “mutual controls” or “checks and balances,” aimed at preventing the invasion of one branch of power into the affairs of others.

(197)

The outcome of these positions is that liberals had a very limited commitment to egalitarianism and were particularly reluctant to promote or allow any type of state interventionism. Gargarella explains that liberals “normally demanded respect for individuals’ autonomous will while disregarding what we could call the ‘conditions for adopting autonomous decisions’” (212).

Gargarella suggests that although radicals were successful in mobilizing...