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Civil War History 49.4 (2003) 406-407



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Glory Enough for All: Sheridan's Second Raid and the Battle of Trevilian Station. By Eric J. Wittenberg. (Washington D.C.: Brassey's Inc., 2001. Pp. 352. Cloth, $27.50.)

Trevilian Station was one of the most decisive cavalry battles of the Civil War but remains a little known engagement. Eric J. Wittenberg seeks to rectify this neglect in the first extensive analysis of the battle. Glory Enough for All recreates Phil Sheridan's raid on the Virginia Central Railroad and places it into the context of Ulysses S. Grant's 1864 Overland campaign. The result is a well-constructed study that is highly critical of Sheridan.

In June 1864 Grant shifted the focus of his campaign to the railroad lines supplying Lee's army. To divert attention from his movements, Grant sent Sheridan's cavalry on a raid into central Virginia and ordered David Hunter's command to take Charlottesville. Sheridan was to link up with Hunter there, and their combined forces would destroy the Virginia Central Railroad west of Richmond. Confederate cavalry, still reeling from J. E. B. Stuart's mortal wounding, seemed to promise light resistance and would be pulled away while Grant crossed the James River east of Richmond.

Sheridan's men reached Trevilian Station just outside of Gordonsville. In desperate fighting that almost saw the annihilation of Custer's famed Wolverines, the Federals pushed Wade Hampton's cavalry off the railroad. However, Hampton skillfully blocked Sheridan's path to Charlottesville. Rather than find another route, the aggressive Sheridan attempted an assault on Hampton's well-placed lines that resulted in a severe repulse. Hunter had failed to move on Charlottesville, and Sheridan had no choice but to end his raid. The foray caused little damage to the railroad. In the Federal retreat, nearly two thousand slaves were liberated, a fact Wittenberg mentions only in passing. The author concludes that the campaign had been an "unmitigated disaster" that "failed to accomplish Grant's strategic objectives" (305).

This conclusion is contradictory to Wittenberg's statement that "although Sheridan had lost the battle . . . the raid drew off the two best divisions of Lee's cavalry" while Grant was making his move to the south of the James River (223). Sheridan may not have destroyed Lee's railroads and shortened the war, but there is no question he aided Grant's strategic objectives. Wittenberg's conclusion that Sheridan does not deserve "the lofty reputation bestowed upon him by history" (xviii) is extreme. The author may not admire Sheridan's performance during the Trevilian raid, but this does not detract from his leadership at Perryville, Stones River, Missionary Ridge, and the 1864 Valley campaign. To discredit him based on one battle is akin to judging Lee's leadership solely on Gettysburg, or Grant on Cold Harbor.

Still, Glory Enough for All is a valuable book. In telling his story, Wittenberg makes good use of memoirs, diaries, letters, and contemporary newspaper accounts. He blends his sources into a readable narrative that successfully describes the battle from the eyes of officers, common soldiers, and civilians. The result is an engrossing human drama. Despite his overly critical treatment of Sheridan, Wittenberg [End Page 406] has produced a useful battle study. The work challenges the perception that the Confederate cavalry ceased to be an effective fighting force after Yellow Tavern.



Glenn David Brasher
University of Alabama

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