Stalin and the Turkish Crisis of the Cold War, 1945-1953 (review)

The Ottoman and Russian empires had a long history of rivalry. From the mid-18th century to 1918 the two empires went to war with each other several times. No other country in Russia's neighborhood has fought Russia so many times. After World War I, when Ottoman Turkey and Tsarist Russia were on opposite sides, the two countries in their new incarnations became archrivals in the Black Sea region and Mediterranean. This new book by the well-known Azerbaijani historian Jamil Hasanli sheds valuable light on a key moment in the early post-1945 era that shaped the next 45 years of Soviet-Turkish relations. Stalin and the Turkish Crisis of the Cold War, 1945-1953 adduces a wealth of evidence to show the complicated nature of bilater relations during World War II and afterward, highlighting the impact of personalities and other factors. The title of the book hints that Iosif Stalin was the main architect of the Turkish crisis of 1945-1953, the same way he was the initiator of the crisis across the perimeter of the Soviet border (the Azerbaijan/Iranian crisis in 1944-1948), the Berlin blockade of 1948-1949, and the Korean war of 1950-1953.

For decades, the Truman doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the division of Europe after World War II were considered the main catalysts of Cold War. Hasanli goes against the flow and challenges the received wisdom about the early Cold War. He argues that the confrontation between the Allies over Iranian Azerbaijan and Turkey is what precipitated the Cold War, or in his terms "the war of nerves." The particular value of Hasanli's book is its rejection of a Europe-centric focus. He argues that "the wave of research on the Cold War in Europe brought by the euphoria of the 1990s upon collapse of the Soviet Union" (p. viii) has obscured the importance of the confrontation over Turkey.

In making his case, Hasanli draws on declassified archival documents from Moscow, Washington, and Ankara, including top-secret materials sent by the Soviet embassy in Ankara to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, regular reviews of the Turkish press with commentaries of embassy officials, secret instructions from Moscow to the Soviet embassy, and the Soviet Politburo's decisions on Turkey. Further valuable materials used in the study are speeches and correspondence of heads of states, letters, and documents produced by diplomatic offices, military agencies, and intelligence services.

The book consists of an introduction, eight chapters, and a conclusion. It recounts the history of Soviet-Turkish relations during the interwar period, particularly the period 1939-1945. Chapter 2 deals with the "War of Nerves," the political maneuvering and negotiations between Turkey and the Soviet Union. Hasanli argues that the Soviet Union was the main actor as it attempted to lodge territorial claims against Turkey and to set up a military base in the Straits. Although the main focus is on Ankara and Moscow, Hasanli also discusses the involvement of other interested parties, including the United States and Great Britain. George Kennan's remark about Soviet policy toward Turkey—"I am sure that the Soviets will not temper their appetite for the Straits. On the contrary, they will take every chance to weaken the west's influence on Turkey and establish friendly regime there" (p. 109)—neatly summarizes Soviets plans toward Turkey. Chapter 3 looks at Stalin's policy toward Turkey. Hasanli shows the role of the Soviet republics of Armenia and to a lesser extent Georgia in ties with Turkey. He discusses Soviet preparations for annexing Turkish territories, the repatriation of Armenians from the Middle East to Armenia, and the deportation of Azerbaijani Turks from Armenia to Azerbaijan.

In chapter 4, Hasanli describes the domestic situation in Turkey and how the Soviet threat forced the Turkish establishment and people to incline toward the West and the United States in particular. Hasanli seeks to draw parallels between Soviet policy [End...