Abstract

In their rulings, international human rights tribunals frequently ask states to engage in costly compliance measures ranging from paying reparations to victims to changing domestic human rights laws and practices. The tribunals, however, have little enforcement or oversight capacity. The responsibility for compliance falls to domestic actors: executives, legislators, and judiciaries. Through nuanced case studies of the compliance process in Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia, this article suggests that compliance with the Inter-American human rights tribunals' rulings depends on executives' political will for compliance and their ability to build pro-compliance coalitions with judges and legislators.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1085-794X
Print ISSN
0275-0392
Pages
pp. 959-985
Launched on MUSE
2012-11-05
Open Access
No
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