Faith and Freedom: Moses Mendelssohn’s Theological-Political Thought (review)

Michah Gottlieb’s important study aims at deepening our understanding of the faith vs. reason debate by focusing on one of its most important and influential exemplars in eighteenth-century philosophy: the “Pantheism debate” between Moses Mendelssohn and Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi. As Gottlieb demonstrates, this controversy deals not primarily with the justification of metaphysical and epistemological issues such as God’s existence or divine providence, but rather with issues of ethics and politics: how important is religion for our moral improvement? And how far can a “Jewish commitment” to enlightened rationalism reach without either disregarding the Jewish tradition or refusing the fundamental beliefs of the Enlightenment? Mendelssohn’s position in this debate is by no means merely a lukewarm theism, which could actually do without any positive religion. Quite to the contrary, as Gottlieb compellingly argues, according to Mendelssohn the belief in a benevolent deity is crucial to achieve happiness, and thus much more than a mere enhancement of the political order. His justification of the importance of religion includes the aesthetic dimension as well: as we can never fully comprehend the divine, we need a detour through intuition. In the case of Judaism, this intuition is best achieved through observance of the halakha, the ritual practice of divine laws. But in contrast to Jacobi, this religious insight does not deflate rationalism. It rather serves as the capstone of rationalism itself. Thus Gottlieb can indeed substantiate Arnold Eisen’s claim that Mendelssohn is “a pluralist to the core” (“Divine Legislation as ‘Ceremonial Script’: Mendelssohn on the Commandments,” AJS Review 15 [1990]: 239–67), while staying true to his Jewish roots.

Gottlieb relates his take on Mendelssohn to the two most prevalent readings of Mendelssohn’s works. On the one hand, Allan Arkush argues (in his 1994 book Mendelssohn and the Enlightenment) that Mendelssohn was a deist, who—out of political considerations—consciously offered (flawed) arguments for the coexistence of enlightened rationalism and traditional Judaism. On the other hand, according to David Sorkin (in his 1996 book Moses Mendelssohn and the Religious Enlightenment), Mendelssohn was deeply convinced of traditional Jewish doctrines, which he reformulated in a modern language. Essentially, these two readings present Mendelssohn as either invoking some overcome ideas in order to convey modern convictions, or using modern language to conceal overcome ideas. According to Gottlieb, both sides misrepresent Mendelssohn’s true conviction that Judaism and rationalism are indeed compatible. More concretely along these lines, Mendelssohn offers a solution to the then-pressing problem of how Judaism fits with the Prussian doctrine of a state: state and religion need to be separate, but can (and should) share the goal of human perfection.

In the course of the four chapters, Gottlieb convincingly argues that the harmony of Judaism and rationalism is indeed at the core of Mendelssohn’s thinking. One of Mendelssohn’s main philosophical ideas concerns the dynamic relations among divine benevolence, individual piety, and obedience to public laws. The first two chapters reflect on the most influential, but opposing, viewpoints on the issue: those of Maimonides and Spinoza. This prepares the ground for a close reading of the Spinozism debate with Jacobi, which stands at the center of chapters 3 (Jacobi) and 4 (Mendelssohn). Gottlieb demonstrates how Mendelssohn, in his later work, argues that religious doctrines can be seen as “rational principles of freedom” (48). The active and reasonable expression of religion must be understood as an essential part of our political and individual freedom. Gottlieb calls this concept Mendelssohn’s “pragmatic religious idealism”: moral action and theoretical understanding both stem from the same human root, “which we are justified in acting upon because it promotes our happiness and perfection” (12). Unlike Jacobi, Mendelssohn does not see reason and its universal verdicts as opposed to individual happiness. On the contrary, it is only through reason that we can understand ourselves as the fundamental units of divine perfection. If we follow Jacobi instead—so Mendelssohn’s interpretation—we are not...