The Naval War of 1812: An Interview with Andrew Lambert
- The Naval War of 1812:An Interview with Andrew Lambert
Would you briefly compare American and British war aims and strategies? How did the Madison administration hope to fight against the dominant global power of the time without raising or funding an army or naval capable of defending the country?
America went to war for land, Spanish Florida, then British North America. The ultimate aim was continental exclusivity, free from foreign powers, native peoples, and for many in the South, barriers to the expansion of plantation slavery. The decision to so without a major increase in defense outlay was opportunistic, and revealed the underlying agenda of exploiting Britain's problems, and Napoleon's anticipated success.
British war aims from day one were simply to make the United States stop invading Canada and return to peace on status quo terms. The British were not expecting or planning war, and had no ulterior objects; although a little border rectification would have been welcome once they began to be successful, it was not worth carrying on the war to secure. The main issue was the European war. It gave Madison an opportunity to seize British North America (Canada) while the British were committed to a total war. He and other American leaders anticipated that the British could not respond in time, i.e., before the end of the 1812 campaign season. The British were able to hold Canada with limited additional [End Page 11] manpower, drawn from the West Indies and not from Europe, and a useful increase in naval power, which was possible because Napoleon's fleets were greatly weakened by the impact of his defeat in Russia 1812 on his naval artillery forces.
How did the war against Napoleon shape the conflict in North America?
Until Napoleon was defeated Canada was vulnerable. British policy and strategy were dominated by France, even after the first abdication of Napoleon the British chose to keep their forces in Europe, to secure a positive result at the Vienna Congress. By contrast the British would not accept any loss of control in the Atlantic, hence the harsh blockade and costly convoys that crushed American economic and naval activity.
How do you assess the efforts of American privateers specifically and commerce warfare in general as a strategy adopted by lesser naval powers?
Republican ideologues assumed that privateering could do serious damage to British shipping. They were wrong. Initial successes were soon countered by well-organized convoys, heavy patrol, and an effective blockade of the Chesapeake Bay, Charleston, New York, and Boston. The idea seems to have been that privateers would distract and weaken the British while America seized Canada. This did not happen, because the army was less effective than the privateers.
Privateering, and the guerre de course more generally, are indecisive strategies at best. They can inflict damage, but there is no record of them ever defeating a major sea power. The American effort failed when it ceased to be based on the private profit from selling captured ships and cargoes and became a campaign of pure destruction, like the U-boat campaign in both world wars.
What are some of the principal myths that continue to surround the naval war of 1812?
That American frigate victories were "fair and equal" contests, that the United States Navy "won," and that privateers were effective.
How do you assess the performance of the U.S. Navy and its commanding officers in the war?
The officers and men performed far better than their feeble government had any right to expect. The seamanship of Isaac Hull, the courage of James Lawrence, and the determination of Thomas Madonough were worthy of a better cause. But to claim "victory" on the basis of a few unequal combats, as the Republican apologists did, was counterproductive. William James's forensic examination of the evidence made this clear 190 years ago. No other navy did half as well against the British in this period, so defeat was no disgrace.
How instrumental was the war in forging an emerging American national identity?
Republican America...
