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  • VietnamFamiliar Patterns and New Developments Ahead of the 11th Party Congress
  • Edmund Malesky (bio), Paul Schuler (bio), and Anh Tran (bio)

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The year preceding a Communist Party congress in Vietnam always has an incongruent nature to it. On the surface, political and economic activity is cautious and deliberate. Elite lawmakers and officials, with prospects of election to Vietnam’s top decision-making body, the Central Committee, are especially careful, knowing that a wrong move in this year could cost them critical votes needed to reach the top echelon. Lower-level bureaucrats hedge their bets about policy implementation until they have a better idea of who their new bosses will be, and economic actors delay some of their long-term plans while they wait for a signal that the year ahead will not bring radical changes in the legal or regulatory environment. Behind the scenes, however, activity can be frenetic, as elites jockey for top positions and party officials struggle to prepare and win support for the policy road maps, such as the Political Report and 10-Year Socio-Economic Plan, which will parameterize policymaking for the next five years.

The intense elite activity would be almost invisible to the casual observer in Vietnam, save for the gossipy whispers in Hanoi coffee shops of amateur [End Page 339] Kremlinologists (or “Ba Dinholologists” as the case may be). Sometimes, however, the elite maneuvering spills into the public realm and influences the lives of average citizens in real and important ways. The most obvious manifestation of this is the crest of Vietnam’s unique five-year political-business cycle, as state investment pours into Vietnamese provinces in an attempt to shore up votes before the congresses.1 A second manifestation is the tactical political maneuvers ahead of a congress, such as exposing corruption scandals in mass media to subvert political opponents and associating oneself positively with policy changes. The year 2010 has also seen its share of such elite gamesmanship.

A couple of whispers consumed the Hanoi coffee class. First, two clear candidates emerged for the position of Vienamese Communist Party (VCP) General Secretary. A group of elites threw support behind Truong Tan Sang, the head of the VCP Central Committee for Economic Affairs and former party secretary of Ho Chi Minh City. Despite excellent credentials, Sang was an unusual choice, as he was born in Long An, and thus his election would violate the informal convention that southerners assume the role of Prime Minister, rather than General Secretary. Others called for the election of the current National Assembly chairman, Nguyen Phu Trong, who has been seen as a neutral arbiter of the National Assembly, and is rumoured to be a favourite of Vietnam’s Chinese interlocutors. His election would mark the second time in a row the position of the General Secretary has been assumed by a former assembly chairman. A second whisper revolved around the survival of Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, who was eligible for another term, but whose chances, despite some policy successes, were damaged by a series of revelations that have not reflected well on his personnel management, particularly the financial crisis of Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group (Vinashin), the state-owned ship building conglomerate. At the time of this writing, the political winds appear to have shifted in favour of both Trong and Dung, who will continue on as Prime Minister but was considered for General Secretary as well, with Sang awarded the presidency as a consolation prize.

In this chapter, we review the events of 2010, showing that in many ways the year resembled other preparatory years for the congress. The important events we discuss such as economic policy choices, the jailing of dissidents, corruption scandals, and an increase in criticism and ideas circulating through the media and internal party circles, fit the general pattern of competing interests vying for power and policy change that has preceded previous party congresses.2

Nevertheless, we will demonstrate that a fascinating change has been evident throughout the various episodes, which augurs well for Vietnam’s future political [End Page 340] development. The slow liberalization of the state institutions has...

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