Pragmatism as Transition: Historicity in James, Dewey, and Rorty (review)

One finds in Colin Koopman’s book a very timely, and consequently quite welcome, vision of the past, present, and possible future of American Pragmatism. Koopman’s stated goal is to “loosen pragmatism up” in order to recast the general direction of that tradition—in both its classical and contemporary forms—with an eye to facilitating the development of its central, but often overlooked, promise. Koopman accomplishes this daunting but critically important task by drawing together a cadre of pragmatist heroes—chiefly, John Dewey and William James, among the classical figures, and Richard Rorty among the neo-pragmatists—and by placing them in dialogue with sympathetic figures drawn from continental philosophy and critical theory, particularly Foucault. As a result, the book deftly addresses two audiences: pragmatists interested in charting a new course for the tradition and philosophers from other traditions looking for ally arguments and positions. In the final chapter, Koopman gives us a skilled and detailed account of just what such a synthesis might look like, using themes drawn from Foucault’s genealogical method and pragmatism’s melioristic commitments, to the mutual benefit of both schools of thought. This is precisely what pragmatism needs if its current rebirth and proliferation is to endure and if the impasses arrived at in the more “popular” traditions (e.g., the Anglo-analytic and the continental) are to be surpassed.

Koopman’s account turns upon the central concept of transitionalism, which he takes to constitute “a renewed third wave of pragmatism,” the heir of classical and neo-pragmatic movements (2). Transitionalism, as Koopman defines it, emphasizes temporality and historicity, and captures pragmatism’s strongest contributions to philosophy as well as deepening its connection with related schools of thought such as process philosophy. Transitionalist pragmatism, in this sense, “moves beyond both linguistic and experiential pragmatism [the central ideas behind the classico- and neo-pragmatic traditions, respectively] in a way that preserves the best insights of each” (179–80). The early chapters of the book introduce this transitionalist narrative, situating it with respect to traditional problems within and surrounding the history and present of pragmatism. The fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters further explicate transitionalism as applied more specifically to epistemology, ethics, and politics. The final chapter brings the promise of these earlier discussions to fruition in what Koopman calls “genealogical pragmatism.”

Koopman has an easy style and a real knack for employing metaphor and example in order to bring abstract concepts into practical and real-life contexts, in a manner that reflects the best commitments of traditional pragmatists. There are, however, a small number of potential dangers inherent in the transitionalist trope. The first arises from implications of the term itself. Most commonly “transitions” occur between and facilitate the move to and from different stages or constituent elements that are themselves relatively fixed. A transition within an essay, for example, serves an important clarifying and aesthetic function; it does not, however, amount to the full argument or essay itself. (Consider a book review that only addressed the transitional elements of the text in question and you will see my point.) In casting the renewed pragmatism Koopman proposes in terms of transition(s) there is a danger, then, of both undercutting its importance—by making it out to be simply that which occurs in the time between the “real” stages of more easily identified philosophical programs—and of effacing the true spirit of Koopman’s model, which emphasizes continual processes rather than static stages.

Another danger of Koopman’s transitionalist device is its impact on the choice of pragmatist heroes Koopman draws on. Most prominently, this account marginalizes C. S. Peirce, whom Koopman believes cannot be situated within his larger project of philosophy as “cultural critique” (41). Peirce, Koopman believes, was primarily an epistemological thinker who has little to offer us in the context of moral and political philosophy (180ff). Now this is certainly not the place to argue about whether or not Peirce’s project can be restricted in this manner—and I...