A Duel of Giants: Bismarck, Napoleon III, and the Origins of the Franco-Prussian War (review)

David Wetzel has courageously taken on what used to be, in the days when modern French history had a privileged status, one of the most favored of topics, the subject of subjects for examination questions. There is, unfortunately, much in the early pages of this study that is likely to put the reader off. To begin with, there is the title, suggesting the traditional "great leaders" approach to history, with its naive biographical excesses, which the first chapter, "A Bit about Personalities," seems to confirm, though it requires considerable generosity to see "Napoléon le Petit" qualifying as a "giant," particularly in the last months of his reign. In general, the "Preface" is not encouraging. There are contradictions: the author aims to "address a series of questions" not fully answered in "the recent literature" on the topic, which he previously claims to be virtually non-existent (xii). There is a quaint coyness when he writes of "the temerity" with which he offers "the present work" (xii) or hopes that the reader will have "the patience to follow this account from beginning to end (if such there be)" (xiii). There are some curious statements, like the assertion that Bismarck's "thin and reedy" voice, "almost a falsetto, [was] the voice of an academic, not of a man of action" (13), or that "only Luther and Goethe rank" with Bismarck "as masters of German prose" (15). There is sententiousness ("He spoke truly" 4; "No words were ever truer" 9) and statements of the obvious, where, for instance, it is solemnly declared that the reader ("it seems to me") has "the right to see the evidence" on which the author's conclusions are based (xiii).

Nevertheless, the author is infinitely better at writing narrative history than he is at writing about his own book and its readers. Indeed, once the account is underway, persistent readers (or faithful reviewers) will live not to regret their persistency. We are guided expertly through the tangled web of Spanish politics after the "revolution" of 1868 in Chapter 2. The book is particularly informative on German politics and diplomacy (Chapter 3) and a far more complex picture of Bismarck's maneuvering emerges than the frequently held view of the Iron Chancellor as, in David Ascoli's words, simply "an evil man," though much in David Wetzel's account hardly seems to justify his obvious sympathy for the Prussian statesman. When he comes to focus on the crucial events of the summer of 1870 (Chapter 4, "The Negotiations at Ems"), the author captures very well the feverish atmosphere of the times and the startling contrast between Gramont's bluster and impetuous zeal and Bismarck's cautious opportunism. There is the telling suggestion that, to a considerable degree, the crisis was kindled by a break-down in "old-style diplomacy" (137). The final chapter, which deals with the prelude to the French declaration of war, is particularly revealing. Not only does the reader gain further insight into the familiar territory of Bismarck's schemes, Napoleon iii's physical and concomitant moral frailties, Gramont's tireless impetuosity, Ollivier's irresolution, but the author skillfully delineates the full context and assesses the true impact and significance of the infamous Ems telegram, which are, so its seems, not quite what they are usually held to be, more a matter of style than substance, more a catastrophe of timing and presentation than the notorious "red rag" to the "Gallic bull." There emerges from this monumental conjuncture of events a curious and inextricable dichotomy. On the one hand, as David Wetzel acutely writes: "Behind the scenes, the wheels of the two great competitive military establishments, the French and the Prussian, had begun to gather speed-grinding along in the manner of such establishments, impervious...