Perforating the Iron Curtain: European Détente, Transatlantic Relations, and the Cold War, 1965–1985 (review)

The topic of détente has become a major field of research. The papers published in this volume were produced for a conference at the University of Copenhagen in late 2007. In their introduction on “the secrets of European détente” the editors stress the importance of the postwar reconstruction in Western Europe, which was accomplished by the mid-1960s and had an enormous impact on the eastern part of the continent. Contrary to the “deep freeze” in the relationship of the superpowers from 1976 to 1985, Europe enjoyed a “lasting détente” (p. 7). Thus, the cover photo showing the smiling and joking leaders of the superpowers is somewhat misleading.

The European détente had its roots in the strength of the West, in particular in the “revitalization of France and West Germany” (p. 7), whereas the East was in need of cooperation with the West and, for various reasons, had little choice but to respond positively to Western initiatives in détente. Bridge-building was appealing for both Western and Eastern Europe. Western proponents of détente wanted to overcome the division of Europe. From an East European perspective the West served as a magnet because of its “increasing affluence, openness and democracy” (p. 8). Eastern regimes, contrary to the desires of large segments of their population, were averse to democracy but became dependent on loans from Western banks and on economic and technological infusions from the West. Furthermore, the main political obstacle to an improvement of East-West relations in Europe disappeared when the Federal Republic of Germany launched its Ostpolitik and, although insisting on the principle of peaceful change of borders, decided to respect the postwar territorial order. Finally, the West impressed the Warsaw Pact countries with the close transatlantic relationship: “The strong alliance between the United States and western Europe made détente more attractive to eastern European elites. It signalled that at least on some issues one could have both the power and productivity of America and the social inclusiveness of France or Germany” (p. 10).

Concluding their introduction, the editors modestly predict “that even more secrets of European détente remain to be revealed” by future “research based on multinational and comparative archival studies” (p. 16). On the whole, most of the papers collected here fulfill these requirements. The two pieces by Wanda Jarząbek and Oliver Bange explore how Poland and the German Democratic Republic reacted to détente and Ostpolitik. Two authors deal with the United States: Giovanni Bernardini on the U.S.–West German relationship “on the road to Helsinki”; and Stephan Kieninger on the conflicting notions of détente held in the White House and the State Department. The impact of the European Community and the neutral and nonaligned (N+N) states on the process of détente and especially on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is analyzed by Angela Romano and Thomas Fischer. Sarah B. Snyder, Gregory F. Domber, and Bent Boel turn to the problem of how the human rights issue in the East was supported or enforced inthe 1970s and 1980s by U.S. and West European governments or non-governmental organizations.

This sample of topics is highly selective and does not cover the whole story of how the Iron Curtain was perforated. Surprisingly, no special treatments of French détente policy and German Ostpolitik (and their rivalry in pushing détente) are included. Regrettably, a paper on economic détente is missing. However, these are wishes that do not detract from the value of this collection in any way. The editors do not discuss whether the notion “Cold War” is really appropriate to describe the whole period of East-West relations from 1946/1947 through 1989/1990. They leave this to Wilfried Loth, who, in his paper on “The Cold War: What It Was About and Why It Ended,” argues...