The Age of Airpower (review)

From the title, readers might guess that Martin van Creveld’s latest book is an uncritical celebration of military aviation. Not so. In this long but highly readable survey, the author argues that airpower reached its high-water mark during World War II, but has steadily declined as the “dominant factor” in warfare ever since (p. 213). Considering the vast amounts spent in the aerospace sector, the number of aircraft and missiles built to deliver nuclear weapons, and the quantity of conventional bombs dropped over the past six decades, this conclusion clearly runs contrary to what many politicians, military leaders, and members of the public believe.

Divided into five parts, the book charts the history of airpower from its origins to the present. Parts 1 and 2 take the reader from the earliest use of balloons for battlefield observation through the end of World War II, when huge fleets of aircraft played an important (but, according to the author, not necessarily decisive) role in the conflict. Seeking to avoid another war of attrition like that of 1914–18, all sides developed different concepts of air-power during the interwar era. But in the end, Germany’s Blitzkrieg tactics, Japan’s aircraft carriers, and the Allies’ strategic bombing campaign all failed to bring about the quick and decisive victory that airpower advocates had promised. Part 3, “The War That Never Was,” examines the role of airpower during the cold war, including the development of bombers and missiles designed to deliver nuclear Armageddon, as well as the fail-safes each member of the “nuclear club” created to prevent unauthorized launches. Part 4 examines the so-called “Little Wars” from 1945 to the present, such as Korea in the early 1950s (where jets met in aerial combat for the first time, though without decisive effect) and the Six-Day War in 1967 (during which the Israeli air force delivered a stunning defeat against the military forces of four neighboring Arab countries). Part 5 explores the one-sided use of airpower against nations or groups that had few or no airpower assets of their own. One case study after another leads van Creveld to conclude that “Contrary to both expectations and propaganda, the use of airpower in such wars has been the record of almost uninterrupted failure” (p. 338). The book ends with a single chapter speculating on the future, in which the author concludes that although airpower remains important, the so-called “age of air-power” is already long gone.

Van Creveld is a master at explaining complex concepts to the intelligent, non-expert reader. He effectively presents specific examples to illustrate his points without getting bogged down in tedious statistics or technical details. His greatest strength lies in his ability to describe airpower in the wider view. For instance, rather than focusing primarily on the United States (or NATO) versus the USSR, as do so many authors of comparative works, van Creveld takes a truly global approach. He casts a wide net in his definition of “airpower” as well, including nearly everything that flies through the air or space. In addition to airplanes and nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles, readers learn about balloons, rockets, antiaircraft defenses, unmanned aerial vehicles, long-range cruise missiles, and satellites. He also breaks with a tradition among many airpower “purists” by examining the evolving role of helicopters.

The author’s arguments prove he is no determinist. He analyzes the different ways that nations organized their air forces and other airpower assets, describing how these choices reflected competing views about the best way to employ airpower, and how these decisions affected each nation’s success (or lack thereof) in war. He also describes how perceptions of airpower’s effectiveness during World War II shaped the ways that decision-makers thought about airpower long into the postwar era. However, by focusing on airpower theory, national strategy, and the public imagination as factors that influenced which pathways various nations pursued, he tends to take technological development for granted. Readers interested...