Soviet Naval Doctrine and Policy, 1956-1986 (review)

Commander Herrick's monumental three-book series on Soviet naval strategic planning, and how it was translated into the creation of the modern Soviet navy by Admiral Sergey Grigoriyevich Gorshkov, is the most detailed account in English of Soviet naval planning during the many wars of the twentieth century. For anyone wanting a clear view into the thinking of Russian naval planners, this series offers explanations and summaries of articles, books, and translations, some of which were not available to English-speaking readers until recently. The value of this series is that it provides access to a wide range of sources describing the Soviet Navy's thinking over a seventy-year period. These books should be part of every military library.

Herrick records how the infant Soviet Navy grew out of the ruins of a Tsarist Navy that had been devastated by fleet-wide mutinies after the 1917 Revolution. The first naval planners were Tsarist naval theoreticians at the Naval War College in St. Petersburg, who went over to the Communist side during the civil war between the Communists and the Whites (forces loyal to the remnants of the Tsarist and Kerensky governments). The infant Soviet navy had to fight a two-front "war" of survival. It had to build a new navy, while fending off the Red Army, which regarded the navy as expensive and fit only to act as a support arm for the Red Army.

In the early days of the Red Fleet, in the years between 1917 and 1939, naval strategists sought to build a modern fleet, composed of submarines, coastal artillery, aircraft, and light surface forces that could wear down an enemy blockade over time (Book I, p. 9). The Soviet naval planners also wanted aircraft carriers and cruisers, but sporadic, vicious political purges of the Soviet naval officers by the KGB and lack of funds stopped such plans (Book I, p. 11). (One example of the impact of these disruptive purges was the demotion—twice—of Gorshkov's predecessor, Admiral Kuznetsov, during the 1950s for political reasons.)

The Red Navy did not win many laurels in World War II. Its primary operations consisted of gunfire support during the siege of Leningrad, small amphibious coastal operations against German shore troops on the Black Sea, and some small river expeditions to assist Russian troops. After World War II, Admiral Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov showed Stalin plans for a large navy, but it never got beyond the blueprint stage. As late as 1950, famous Navy theoretician Vyunenko argued that the Red Fleet ought to limit itself to raids on enemy naval bases, ports, and coastal installations (Book I, p. 45). By the mid-1950s, there was opposition to the very existence of the Red Fleet (Book I, p. 89). But in January 1956, Admiral Gorshkov assumed command of the Soviet Navy, inaugurating a new era.

Initially, Gorshkov had to contend with the indifference of Stalin's successor, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, a blunt Ukrainian peasant, who declared during a 1959 visit to America: "Combat ships are good only for making state visits" (Book I, p. 94). But by 1964, Gorshkov (who outlasted Khrushchev), had obtained new surface ASW ships (Book I, p. 98). Strategic planning shifted away from coastal defense to aircraft carriers, use of marines in amphibious landings, and the deployment of guided missiles and nuclear weapons (Book I, p. 213). During the 1970s, the Soviet naval planners focused on "command of the sea." How much of the sea did the Soviet navy need to dominate to keep the imperialists at bay? (Book II, p. 427). By 1975, Gorshkov...