The organization of land warfare in Europe at the time of Columbus, and a brief comparison with Aztec warfare

The organization of land warfare in Europe at the time of Columbus, and a brief comparison with Aztec warfare War always has two aspects. The public aspect consists of the aims, actions and results of war for rulers, states and societies, including the extent to which official or communal effort and authority collect, arm and support the actual fighting-men. The private aspect includes not only the misfortunes of non-combatants, but also the extent to whichfightingmen, as individuals or groups, volunteer for service, their motives for doing so, thenrelationswith the warlords (rulers or states w h o initiate and allegedly control wars) and the extent to which some or all of the fighting-men equip, train and support themselves. It also includes the extenttowhich basically private troups act without, or even against the orders of warlords in ways reminiscent of the early feudalrightof private war.1 From the high middle ages to the high Renaissance in west central Europe the feudal obligations of military service became less and less important in forming andfillingthe armies, while financial inducements of pay and plunder became increasingly important for the active participants in war.2 In the Early Modern period, the private sector of the organization of war was greatiy changed andfinallyreduced.3 B y 1700 the private aspect of war contained only the suffering of non-combatants and sometimes, in some areas, the voluntary enlistment of soldiers.4 B y then west central European rulers controlled the recruitment, pay and training of all the military, and the purchase or manufacture of all weapons, equipment and (uniform) clothing for them. Warlords by then held soldiers under a discipline which had abandoned all the medieval foundations for, conditions of and restraints on military service; a discipline which would turn the men and even the officers 1 For further reading on the place of war and soldiers in western Europe i period preceding and covering the lives of Columbus and the conquistadores see M. E. Howard, War in European History, London 1976; W . H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: technology, armed force and society, Chicago, 1982; T. Ropp War in the Modern World; L. Montross, War through the Ages, 3rd edn, New York, 1960; R. Preston et al., Men in Arms, 4th ed., N e w York, 1979. 2 C. Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages, London, 1953. 3 C. Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, New York, 1979. 4 M. Mallett, Mercenaries and their Masters, London, 1974. P A R E R G O N ns 12.2 (January 1995) 52 G. F. T. Jones almost into unthinking robots, going where, behaving as, and fighting w h o m then rulers chose. This complete state control was the endresultof a gradual process which had many setbacks, since the weakess and poverty of most European states often allowed public military control to be temporarily eroded. The earlier feudal model was of obligatory military service which was originally at least unpaid (except by land-holdingrights)and limited in time to a few weeks each year, service obligatory for all land-holders who had to be fully equipped at then own expense. This model was gradually mixed with and finally replaced by a reliance on hired fighting men—whose services were unlimited in time; indeed limited only by the availability of payment in wages or plunder.5 This could be seen during the period of transition as in some ways a great advance in the privatization of war. In theory, in the pure feudal model, the whole armed force was public; all ablebodied knights were part of the knight-service host of the realm. The practice of the feudal model differed from the theory. This was because the lesser land-holders were vassals of the greater vassals and in fact this allegiance was primarily or even solely to then immediate lords, so that in practice the rebellion of a count or an earl included the revolt of then followers, virtually their private armies. The powers and even therightsof vassals could in theory or in practice limit the feudal monarch's right or ability to make war. In the period from the...