Axiogenesis: An Essay in Metaphysical Optimalism (review)

With the possible exception of Cartesian dualism, no modern philosophical view is more maligned than Leibniz’s claim that ours is the best of all possible worlds. With Axiogenesis (2010), Nicholas Rescher has made a noteworthy contribution to the Platonic-Leibnizian tradition of metaphysical optimalism that may finally succeed in restoring this view to intellectual respectability. In addition—and more importantly—Rescher has provided a rare example of how to keep discussions of ultimate questions, as he puts it, “on this side of nonsense” (9). Even those who are not convinced by his argument will be grateful for the opportunity it provides to refine and advance their own views. And this is no small feat: Rescher’s clear and cogent argumentation shows that it is possible to make progress on questions that many professional philosophers have abandoned as fruitless.

Rescher begins his case for metaphysical optimalism with the observation that those who would persuade us to abandon the search for ultimate explanations of why things are the way they are cannot dispense with reasons of an ultimate sort. As F. H. Bradley put it, “The [person] who is ready to prove that metaphysical knowledge is impossible . . . is a [fellow] metaphysician with a rival theory of first principles” (cited p. 5). Rescher grants that we have the option to remain silent, but for those who cannot restrain the urge to speculate, he makes three principal suggestions: 1) for ultimate answers, we must move beyond existence, from actuality to possibility, and seek the reasons why certain possibilities and not others are realized; 2) to avoid infinite regress, the kinds of reasons we should seek are values, because their holistic, complex, integrative, and above all harmonic character is self-justifying; 3) the pivotal measure of value—of what is for the best—is intelligence.

Through the elaboration of these primary themes—the transition from possibility to actuality, recourse to holistic, value-realizing kinds of explanation, and use of intelligence as a norm—Rescher constructs a rigorous case for metaphysical optimalism that can be summarized as follows: out of all possible worlds, ours exists because its harmonization of natural laws supports the evolution and the effective use of intelligence. Or, to put the thesis another way, given that ours is evidently a noophelic world (i.e. geared for intelligence in the senses just described), we can understand its laws, and the principles that explain these laws holistically as a system, as optimal in relation to other, less noophelic possibilities.

At first glance—especially when presented so succinctly—Rescher’s thesis might appear simplistic, but those who would dismiss optimalism out of hand must take account of his careful qualifications of what it really entails. Rescher deflects most of the standard objections that have been directed at the Platonic-Leibnizian tradition (or at caricatures thereof). He makes clear that his position is in no way Pollyannish. On the contrary, because of the necessity of trade-offs between competing values, the best of all possible worlds must disappoint most of its inhabitants most of the time. In fact Rescher’s picture of optimalism is at times so dark that it brings to mind a famous quote attributed to Winston Churchill: “Democracy is the worst form of government except all the others.” Likewise, Rescher’s best of all possible worlds might be better described as the worst except all the others. Rescher also clarifies that his position is friendly to but does not entail theism, and that his view of nature as geared for intelligence should not be confused with arguments that nature is designed by a supreme intelligence. And the fact that nature is geared for intelligence in general should not be taken to entail that nature is kind to our particular values and purposes.

But aside from this reader’s view that Rescher’s argument for metaphysical optimalism is cogent and compelling, what is its pay-off? What difference does it...