Gettysburg: The Meade-Sickles Controversy (review)

Serious students of the battle of Gettysburg are already familiar with the sound scholarship of this excellent book because it was originally published in 1989 under the title A Caspian Sea of Ink: The Meade-Sickles Controversy. With minor revisions to the preface, some small text updates to incorporate recent Gettysburg scholarship, and an upgrade to the photographs, Brassey's has essentially published a new edition of the book under the title Gettysburg: The Meade-Sickles Controversy. A larger printing production than the original thousand copies in 1989 and insertion of the word "Gettysburg" into the title will make this very readable analysis of the Meade-Sickles controversy more accessible to readers of Civil War fare.

Richard Sauers specifically states that the goal of the book is not to provide a detailed analysis of Major General Daniel E. Sickles's unauthorized forward movement of his Third Army Corps on the afternoon of 2 July 1863 from the main army line trace along Cemetery Ridge to an exposed position along the Emmitsburg Road, three-quarters of a mile from the support of the rest of the Army of the Potomac. The author clearly states that the goal of the book is to chronicle Sickles's decades-long conduct of a despicable mud-slinging campaign to justify his own stupendously bad judgment on the battlefield and to discredit the man who won the Battle of Gettysburg—Major General George G. Meade. The author clearly proves his thesis that Sickles's one-sided and self-serving version of events at Gettysburg eventually shaped public opinion after the Civil War to the point that Meade's reputation suffered. Unfortunately, many Civil War researchers also accepted Sickles's story, thereby skewing much of Gettysburg historiography to faulty conclusions about the battle.

To prove his point, the author examined in scholarly detail the four points upon which Sickles spun his contrived tale of his actions during the battle. First, Sickles complained that he never received from Meade any orders on 2 July concerning the positioning of his corps. Sauers, using well-researched primary sources, concludes that Sickles clearly received specific enough instructions on repeated occasions during 2 July directing him to occupy the Cemetery Ridge-Little Round Top line. Second, Sickles complained that the position he was to occupy was a weak position dominated by high ground to his front. The author's analysis of this point includes Sickles's inability to recognize that Little Round Top was the key to the Union left flank. Third, Sickles contended that his skirmishers detected the Confederate movement to attack the Union left during the morning of 2 July. Therefore, he moved to the advanced line at the Peach Orchard and, thereby, prevented General James Longstreet's corps from outflanking the Union left flank and thus saved the battle for the Federals. The author shows that Longstreet's late afternoon attack did not go according to General Robert E. Lee's original design because Lee did not know the precise location of the Union left flank. Lee considered the Peach Orchard position as a starting point of an attack up the Emmitsburg Road and not as an objective point to seize. Sickles's spin was that by occupying the Peach Orchard he thwarted Longstreet's attack. Fourth, Sickles contended that by moving to his advanced position he stopped the Army of the Potomac from retreating. Sauers convincingly shows that while Meade did issue a contingency order called the Pipe Run Circular in case of a retreat, he never seriously considered a retreat of the Army of Potomac once the battle was joined. To quote the author, "Sickles' claim of a retreat never did have anything to do with his position at Gettysburg."

This well-researched book is a significant contribution to the historiography of the Battle of Gettysburg. It...