Israel and the Bomb (review)

180 SHOFAR Winter 2001 Vol. 19, No.2 Roman relations. He takes as examples the symbolism ofploughing Jerusalem when it was reconstituted as Aelia Capitolina and a story of a rabbi who refused a gift from a Roman official. It should be clear from this brief summary that the section headings are rather arbitrary, and that some ofthe essays could just as easily be placed in a different part. One suspects that the divisions were imposed on this highly diverse collection to reassure the publisher of its thematic unity. But it should also be clear that this is a remarkably interesting and learned collection of essays, many of which open up new angles of approach to the study of Judaism in the Hellenistic, and more especially the Roman periods. The diversity of the essays offers something for many different interests. Gruen and Horbury are somewhat exceptional in the volume in focusing on literary evidence, mainly from the pre-Christian period. Seth and Daniel Schwartz deal with historical issues, also from the Hellenistic age. The predominant contributions of the volume, however, are to the social history of Jews in the Roman period. Isaac and Noy (and also Rajak) deal with archeological evidence; Cotton and Oppenheimer with legal documents; Baumgarten, Levine, and Williams with community organization (Baumgarten's essay deals mainly with the Hellenistic period); Satlow, Joshua Schwartz, and Stem (and also Rajak) with cultural values and assumptions. The essays of Satlow and Joshua Schwartz are noteworthy for their attention to aspects of culture that seldom receive attention in standard treatments; Baumgarten's work is important for its thorough-going sociological approach. But there is much to be learned from all these essays, and ifthey are characterizedmore by diversity than by thematic unity, they suggest that the same may be true of Judaism in the Greek and Roman periods. John J. Collins Divinity School University ofChicago Israel and the Bomb, by Avner Cohen. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. 470 pp. $29.95 (c). Israel's development of nuclear weapons, beginning about 40 years ago, and the attendant limitations on divulging information about the project officially, produce a fascinating story. Despite innumerable attempts to force the government to acknowledge that indeed it does possess the bomb, the standard position remains largely what it was in the 1960s: "Israel will not be the fIrst to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East." At one time, there might have been some doubt; the unusual formulation kept outsiders guessing. But now that it is widely accepted that Israel has such weapons, and in quantity, it is reasonable to ask whether the traditional policy still makes sense. Given the intense secrecy that has surrounded the project, Israel has never had a full-scale political debate on the subject ofnuclear weapons. With the genie out ofthe bottle, not only in the sensational fashion associated with Mordechai Vanunu's revel- Book Reviews 181 ations or in the journalistic treatment of Seymour Hersh, but finally in a scholarly format that adroitly uses recently released government archival material, perhaps the long-awaited debate canbegin. Butas Avner Cohen demonstrates so persuasively in this very thoroughly researched volume, the whole matter of nuclear weapons is such a sensitive issue that hardly anyone in Israel seems inclined to initiate public debate. Cohen analyzes the long-standing Israeli policy of opacity and demonstrates how it evolved in response to the necessities ofthe critical developmental period, when Israel was reluctant to confront openly the non-proliferation policies pursued by the United States. The U.S., for its part, played along by not compelling Israel to reveal the secrets ofthe Dimona reactor and even sent inspectors (to Israel they were just visitors) to the facility on a regular basis during the 1960s. However, Israel managed, through a combination of deception and delay, to prevent them from observing anything that might confirm the existence of a nuclear weapons program. Furthermore, all of the visits were held on Saturdays at Israel's insistence, which minimized the contact between the visitors and regular personnel at the reactor. Thus the U.S. never gathered conclusive evidence about the program. Despite strong suspicions within the intelligence community, the political echelon never...