The particular judgments of practical reason play crucial roles in Jewish ethics, in applying rules, balancing concerns, and specifying the realization of values. While acknowledging the elusive character of practical reason, the paper develops an account in which these judgments are not only acceptable stopgaps, but may offer valuable contributions. It builds on Aristotle's classical discussion of phronesis, intelligence or practical wisdom, and Richard Boyd's contemporary account of the role of trained judgments in both science and ethics. In the model presented, the particular judgments of practical reason reflect both specific situational circumstances and more general values and holistic concerns. Particular judgments both are shaped by Jewish values and norms, and present new input that enriches the system of Jewish ethics, leading to its refinement and growth.


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pp. 110-124
Launched on MUSE
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