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Book Reviews 171 This development gave the Palestinian national movement much-needed autonomy from the Arab states, and also coincided with a fragmentation of the ranks. Since then the PLO, with Arafat at the helm, has attempted to monopolize the means of violence, an effort that at times has brought him into clashes with his own forces and comrades in arms. Although Arafat was never able to bring other groups under his command (not surprising given that the monopolization of the means of violence is always incomplete ), there did occur a progressive centralization and nationalization ofthe means of violence. The PLO also attempted to maintain the means ofrule through a bureaucratic apparatus, in this case one built on a neopatrimoniallogic. Although this served well the task of political survival, it also institutionalized a fairly inefficient and corrupt bureaucratic administration. The reader is treated to a systematic examination ofa statebuilding process in a nonterritorial context, and the obvious temptation is to race ahead ofthe narrative and connect these processes to post-Oslo developments. In this context a curious claim made by Sayigh is that while the PLO might have lacked many of the qualities of "stateness," it can still be treated as a "statist" entity. This fairly controversial claim seems unnecessary. His overall argument does not rest on whether or not the PLO can properly be categorized as "statist," for the theoretical and historical links can still be made to other state-building experiences without making this move. Moreover, Sayigh appears to argue that because the effects of the PLO's activities were similar to the effects produced by states in state-building contexts, then it stands to reason that the PLO was statist. I am not convinced of either the argument or the necessity ofit. But this comment, I confess, is a minor point that does not detract from the book's central arguments regarding Palestinian state-building. This is a superb book. I sincerely doubt that we will see anytime soon a more thorough, comprehensive, or convincing treatment of the Palestinian national movement. The only real regret is that Sayigh only takes us through 1993. I can hardly wait for the next installment. Michael Barnett Department of Political Science University of Wisconsin-Madison The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Middle East Politics and the Quest for Regional Order, by Avraham Sela. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998). 423 pp. $24.95 (p). The back cover blurb ofAvraham Sela's new work is an unusual case of under- rather than over-selling the book it describes. This book is much more than an "extremely complete account ofthe public record ofthe diplomatic history ofthe Arab world," or 172 SHOFAR Winter 2000 Vol. 18, No.2 a treatment of Arab summitry alone. Beyond this, the author offers a comprehensive account ofthe regional dynamics ofinter-Arab politics, the ways these have shifted over time, and the particular position ofthe Arab-Israeli conflict within this context. Specifically, Selaargues that the Arab world has demonstrated an increasing ability to "insulate itselffrom rallying issues ofsymbolic Arab concerns and conduct its autonomous policies" (p. 341). This has occurred through a shift from transnational political symbolism (notably Arab nationalism) to a regional order based on state sovereignties, solidified by on-going processes of state-building and regime consolidation. This process of"westphalianization" ofthe regional system was accelerated by the Arab (and especially Egyptian) defeat in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and reinforced by the growing power ofthe Arab oil monarchies from the 1970s onwards. The growing focus ofthe Palestinian movement on a territorial solution in the West Bank and Gaza-and the shift ofthe movement's political center ofgravity there through the 1980s-further confirmed this transformation. With the Oslo agreement and mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO, the Palestinian issue was removed as a tool (and weapon) of domestic and regional mobilization for Arab regimes. The result, Sela suggests, is that "the 'classic' Arab-Israeli conflict is over" (p. 350). This is not a new argument, although Sela's treatment ofit is particularly well done. The salience of what Michael Hudson has called "core Arab concerns" has been explored (and often hotly...

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