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David Ben-Gurion: Politics and Leadership in Israel (review)
- Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies
- Purdue University Press
- Volume 11, Number 4, Summer 1993
- pp. 130-132
- 10.1353/sho.1993.0045
- Review
- Additional Information
- Purchase/rental options available:
130 SHOFAR Summer 1993 Vol. 11, No.4 themselves with the affairs of the region. The interaction between the two types of activity flowed from the politico-strategic concepts of the two belligerents. The two local actors, Egypt and Israel, saw the war as a means of achieving their political aims. Military activity was seen by both sides as likely to further the desired political solution or to block the unwanted political solution. The existence of intensive diplomatic activity on the part of the superpowers served as a convenient arena for both sides' maneuvers in military initiatives. The relative success or failure of these military moves determined the nature of the diplomatic activity in the different phases of the war. This kind of interaction became a very dangerous game when the Soviet Union intervened militarily in the war following Israel's air escalation that endangered the Egyptian regime by bringing Egypt very close to a new total defeat. The War of Attrition ended in stalemate in 1970. In his introduction to the book (p. 6), Korn argues that: "It is a central thesis of this study that the failure of the Israelis to acknowledge that the War of Attrition did not end in victory for their side, and their failure to grapple with the implications of that fact, led them to a false sense of security; and that this, in turn, caused them to neglect opportunities for an interim agreement with Egypt." This thesis, which is most interesting although not new, was not examined in the book. I believe that its examination could have contributed to the understanding of the period between 1970 and 1973 and to the quality of the ,book. In summary, Korn's book is more a descriptive book than an academic study. The only thesis which was introduced was not examined. The passages in the book from analysis of the developments to biographical description of some of the main figures, and the chapter "Behind the Lines," interrupt the sequence of the book. Nevertheless, it was a pleasure to read the book. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov The HebrewUniversity ofjerusalem and the University of Florida David Ben-Gurion: Politics and Leadership in Israel, edited by Ronald W. Zweig. London: Frank Cass, 1991. 311 pp. If leaders are tested in hard times, Ben-Gurion's career is a chronicle ofextraordinary survival. David Ben-Gurion's life coincides not simply with Book Reviews 131 the making of the Jewish state but also with its emergence as a regional power. During his tenure, the standard of living in Israel rose substantially. That Ben-Gurion's leadership affected the development of Israel before and after statehood is unquestioned. What is contested by many peoplescholars and politicians-is how positive a role he played in directing policies and in shaping the political system of the state. Ben-Gurion's career ·has always inspired extremes of esteem and disdain. Because many of the questions surrounding Ben-Gurion's career attend the larger study of Israeli politics, Tel Aviv University historian Ronald Zweig set out to bring together in one volume, on the occasion of the one-hundredth anniversary of Ben-Gurion's birth, major published articles which examined Ben-Gurion's long political career. Zweig discovered relatively few works in print. Partly because enough time has elapsed to provide sufficient perspective, and partly because of newly opened archives, Professor Zweig assembled a group of Israeli scholars to reflect on the intersection ofBen-Gurion's career with the course ofIsraeli politics. The essays in David Ben-Gurion: Politics and Leadership in Israel advance not only our knowledge of Ben-Gurion's political activities, they also deepen our understanding of critical eras in the history of the Jewish state. Still, Ben-Gurion's political life is subject to multiple readings. The difficulties arise not simply because so much is unknown or the record is so spare but rather because Ben-Gurion consciously sent out contradictory signals at one and the same time. At times he wished to obfuscate his views more than he wished to clarify them. Acutely sensitive to his several audiences, Ben-Gurion understood that even after achieving independence, Israel's viability depended on...