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  • Diaspora-Israel Relations: A Long-Term Perspective
  • Yehezkel Dror (bio)

Professor Gabriel Sheffer’s paper raises important issues. I would like to supplement and in some respects change his theses by looking at Diaspora-Israel relations from a different perspective, namely a long-term one covering the 21st century and, in part, beyond.

Some conceptual clarifications are needed:

  1. 1. The issue is not one of “relations between World Jewry and Israel,” because World Jewry includes the Jews living in Israel, which constitute about half of the Jewish people. Rather, the issue is one of Diaspora-Israel relations. For many purposes, the issue should be conceptualized in a broader way as including the cohesion of the Jewish People as a whole, what is nowadays often called “Jewish Peoplehood.”

  2. 2. Much depends on our understanding of the nature of the Jewish People. Sheffer seems to view it as a kind of ethnic-national entity. I think this is too narrow. Instead, I propose to view the Jewish People primarily as a civilizational entity. This involves, inter alia, regarding Israel in many critical respects as a “civilization state,” as in modern literature in respect to China, rather than a “nation state”.

  3. 3. While mentioned apropos in Sheffer’s paper, much more attention should be paid to the role of religion in shaping attitudes towards Israel, in part instead of the term “hard core” Jew.

The last point serves to introduce one of my main theses, namely that the Jewish People as a whole, and Diaspora-Israel relations in particular, are likely to change radically within the next two generations. This is recognized by Sheffer, but deserves major emphasis and treatment. An important methodological conclusion follows: the more a domain is likely [End Page 86] to change non-linearly the less are surveys, however interesting, relevant for considering the future. At the very least surveys should focus on the younger generation, but this too is inadequate, as new trends require at least two generations in order to become clear and at least somewhat stable—as far as possible in a world undergoing ultra-change (that is, change in the very pattern of change).

Religion is a clear case in point. Much literature dealing with the future of religions can be divided into three schools: one claims that religious beliefs are likely to strengthen and exert more influence; a second claims that they are likely to weaken and lose influence; and a third claims that the future of religion is shrouded in uncertainty and cannot be foreseen.

I agree with the third position. This has profound implications for the future of Diaspora-Israel relations. Thus, to take what seems to be an unlikely but not impossible scenario, let us assume that a majority of Israeli and Diaspora Jews become Orthodox. This surely will impact on the future of relations differently from a future in which most Jews in both Israel and the Diaspora care very little about religion.

Sheffer rightly discusses however briefly, the impact of Israeli policies on relations with the Diaspora. Nevertheless, however stubborn the Arab-Israeli conflict is, it surely will be very different in, say, fifty years. Thus, there may be a comprehensive Middle East peace, or Israel may be in existential danger from a “wild” Middle East armed with weapons of mass killing. Such different alternative futures are sure to have differential implications for Diaspora-Israeli relations.

These implications may be quite paradoxical. Thus, if a comprehensive Middle East peace is achieved Israeli policies may be widely acclaimed in the Diaspora. However, Israel will be perceived as less in need of support, and perhaps as less “exciting,” with a decrease in interest being the result.

Overall, I prefer a largely conjectural view of the future of Diaspora-Israeli relations. Yet this does not imply chaos. Some outlook is possible, based on social science and policy planning knowledge, which in turn can serve as a basis for creative, learning and open-ended policies. However, to do so, it is necessary to try and consider deeper relatively stable historical factors which drive the future within partly foreseeable time horizons, say the end of the 21st century. Fixation on surface phenomena may...

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