Recasting Mišpāṭîm: Legal Innovation in Leviticus 24:10–23

The story of the blasphemer in Lev 24:10–23 is one of four legal narratives in the Pentateuch’s Priestly literature.¹ Each of these stories presents a “hard case” legal scenario set in the desert wanderings in which Moses resorts to divine adjudication to resolve a legal dilemma.² In the blasphemer case, the will of Yhwh is sought to determine a sentence for the half-breed who committed blasphemy in the course of a brawl (vv. 10–12). Apparently it was not known whether the perpetrator’s mixed parentage mitigated his culpability, or if he was subject to the same law as the native Israelite.³ In the end, the latter option proved true (vv. 15–16), and the perpetrator was executed (v. 23).

The focus of this article will concern the peculiar presence of a series of casuistic laws in the blasphemy narrative in Lev 24:17–21, which is translated below.

Whoever takes a human life shall surely be put to death. Whoever takes an animal’s life shall make it good, life for life. If anyone injures his neighbor, as he has done it shall be done to him, fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth; whatever injury he has given a person shall be given to him. Whoever kills an animal shall make it good, and whoever kills a person shall be put to death

(Lev 24:17–21 English Standard Version [ESV]).

These verses are of interest because they appear to be out of place in the context of the narrative (Lev 24:10–23). In the end I will argue that the manner in which this legal material was incorporated into the narrative calls for an innovation to one of Israel’s native legal traditions (found in Exod 21:1–22:16) from an ethnic-based jurisdiction to a territorial-based jurisdiction. This innovation was required by the Holiness Code’s (H) theological perception of the promised land, which sought to ensure that no inhabitant, native or alien, would pollute the land through violation of the legal ideals of an older venerated tradition.

In order to demonstrate this, my discussion will be divided into four sections. The first will outline the problem with this combination of the laws of vv. 17–21 with the narrative. This will be followed by a summary of past explanations. The third section will comprise the bulk of the article, where I will suggest a new solution to this problem. Finally, the fourth section will provide some implications for the field of pentateuchal studies.

I. The Problem

The most distinguishing feature of the blasphemy narrative, which sets it apart from the other “hard case” legal narratives,⁴ is the presence of a series of casuistic laws that deal with a range of basic legal issues (homicide, assault, and property damage). These laws stand out from the regular pattern of the narratives for two reasons. First, they appear to bear little relevance to their context. In the other two cases where casuistic stipulations are found, the laws are a natural outgrowth of the narrative’s legal quagmire; the rulings in the episodes of Num 9:6–14 and 27:1–11 each set a precedent, which, in turn, gives rise to enduring legislation (i.e., casuistic law). In other words, there is an organic connection between unclean Passover observers (the specific situation) and new Passover legislation (enduring law), as well as between women’s inheritance rights in the absence of male progeny and new inheritance law.⁵ By contrast, the laws of Lev 24:17–21 are at best only tangentially (or perhaps figuratively or even cosmologically) related to the case at hand. What have homicide, assault, and property damage to do with a case of blasphemy?

Second, the legal series appears to disrupt the flow of an otherwise smooth narrative. The other three stories follow a predictable pattern; two cases reach their climax with the divine amendment of old laws to accommodate mitigating circumstances (Num 9:9–14; 27:8–11), while the...