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The American Journal of Bioethics 3.3 (2003) 35-36



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Patents on Human-Animal Chimeras and Threats to Human Dignity

David B. Resnik
East Carolina University

I am grateful to Jason Scott Robert and Françoise Baylis (2003) for their thought-provoking article on the variety of scientific, philosophical, and ethical issues related to the creation of human-animal chimeras. They are correct in their assertion that this problem has received little attention in the bioethics literature. I made a brief comment about this issue in an article I published titled "DNA Patents and Human Dignity" (Resnik 2001b). I addressed a patent application filed by Newman on a human embryo with chimpanzee genes or a "humanzee." The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) rejected the application, but the decision is under appeal. Biotechnology critic J.Rifkin supported Newman's application because he thought it would force the courts to rule on whether human genes are patentable (Marshall 1999). In my discussion of this patent I argued that it would threaten but not violate human dignity because the humanzee would not be a human being. I stressed, however, that the humanzee patent would pose a significant threat to human dignity because it would be a patent on something that is almost human and would be a dangerous step toward a patent on a human being (Resnik 2001b).

There is a difference between violating human dignity and threatening human dignity. A violation of human dignity occurs when one treats a whole human being, or a part of a human being closely connected to the whole human being, as a complete commodity. Treating a human being as a complete commodity violates human dignity because it treats that individual as having only an extrinsic value; that is, as having only a market value (Radin 1996). Patents on whole human genomes would violate human dignity, as would patents on human embryos. Patents on human gametes or stem cells would not violate human dignity (see Resnik 2001a; 2001b; 2002).

A threat to human dignity occurs when one engages in a practice that could lead to violations of human dignity. Patents on individual human genes, tissues, or other body parts would threaten but not violate human dignity, because they would treat human beings as incomplete commodities, not as complete commodities (Resnik 2001a; 2001b; 2002). The threat to human dignity posed by the commodification of human body parts arises because incomplete commodification of a thing can lead to complete commodification (Radin 1996). People's attitudes toward a thing can change as they begin to view that thing as having a market value, even if they also recognize that it also has a nonmarket value, because market values can drive out nonmarket values. The claim that incomplete commodification leads to complete commodification is a classic version of the slippery slope argument (Resnik 2001b).

Although it is important to respond to genuine threats to human dignity, it would not be reasonable to prevent all possible threats to human dignity, because this strategy would require societies to forego important opportunities or violate basic rights. In order to decide how to best address a practice that threatens human dignity, one must carefully weigh and consider the potential benefits and harms of the practice and consider any rights that might be at stake. Some threats are acceptable because their benefits outweigh their harms and preventing those threats would require us to violate basic rights. For example, patenting DNA poses a threat to human dignity because it could contribute to a trend toward complete commodification of human beings. On the other hand, permitting the patenting of DNA also has significant benefits for science, technology, industry, agriculture, and medicine because it provides a financial incentive for inventors, investors, and entrepreneurs. Also, prohibitions on DNA patents could undermine intellectual property rights. Taking all this into account, one could say that the most reasonable response to the problems posed by DNA patents is not to prohibit them but to pay careful attention to the laws and policies that apply to this practice...

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