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This Proposition is Not True: C.S. Peirce and the Liar Paradox
- Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy
- Indiana University Press
- Volume 47, Number 4, Fall 2011
- pp. 421-444
- 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.47.4.421
- Article
- Additional Information
Abstract
I have two aims in this essay. First, I shall show that Peirce rejected his 1869 solution to the Liar Paradox in 1903 but never explicitly proposed a third solution. This has yet to be noted in the literature. Second, I shall argue that if we accept Peircean theories of truth, assertion and assent, then we can avail ourselves of a novel solution to the Liar Paradox.
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